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Platform Driving in Seattle: In Brief 
Our Charge 
Our charge sounded relatively simple: use very fine-grained data collected by transportation 
network companies (TNCs) Uber and Lyft to determine how much drivers on these platforms 
earn per hour in the City of Seattle.  We would receive the complete data for all the drivers in 
Seattle. In principle, our results should be more dependable than those that rely instead on the 
published averages of the platforms. They should also be more credible than studies based on 
survey data, because the design of those questionnaires and the driver sampling strategies 
generally fail to meet the standards for sound organizational research. With this data, we wanted 
to provide independent third-party analysis for a crucial question of our time: what do platform 
drivers earn? 
This summary begins by providing the earnings estimates that emerged from our data.  Readers 
will see wide variation in earnings estimates for two reasons: (1) we compare implications of 
different assumptions, and (2) earnings vary widely among drivers. We find that our estimates 
are very sensitive to various assumptions that we—or anyone working with the data—must 
make. In addition, unlike a normal service-sector job, where people doing the same work earn 
roughly the same amount, platforms drivers show extraordinary earnings variation. In our data, 
during the same week and using the same assumptions, we found some drivers making less than 
$10/hour while others earned more than $40 dollars/hour. A single number of central tendency 
(be it the median, mean, or something else) will never represent the range of experiences of TNC 
drivers. In the larger report, we detail all the factors that made our seemingly simple task far 
more complicated than one might expect. 
We also want to be very clear about what readers will not find in this report. Our role is not to 
serve as defenders or apologists for the TNCs, whose data we analyze here and who, as is typical 
for university research, paid for the costs of this study (though none of the researchers themselves 
received any additional compensation, there are additional costs to carrying out research). 
Accumulated research to date suggests that their business model may be inimical to worker 
interests, owing to the power TNCs wield in both the labor market and the rides market. Since 
we were not asked to triangulate our quantitative estimates with worker interviews or surveys, 
we cannot and do not address those findings here. In providing our quantitative estimates, at 
minimum, we ask that they not be taken out of context by the City of Seattle or others. Furthermore, 
these findings cannot be generalized to other cities, domestically or internationally. If our 
findings raise questions about drivers’ earnings in other places, the answer is more research 
rather than speculative leaps. We can also go a step further, for those who might misinterpret 
our findings as suggesting that all platform drivers are highly compensated. That is not the case. 
Our various estimates suggest that many drivers earn below the minimum wage. This finding 
supports the establishment of an earnings floor for rideshare drivers, if not broader policies that 
would increase drivers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the TNCs. 
At the same time, neither is it our role to be critical of TNCs. We are not committed to showing 
that the ride-share industry is uniquely pernicious in underpaying Seattle workers. Our 
benchmarking data, for instance, show that many typical service economy jobs—with the 
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protections of employment law—also pay workers below what many might consider a living 
wage. And, of course, many drivers earn far more through platform driving than they would earn 
in these other kinds of work. 
Our goal is to accurately and truthfully analyze the patterns in the data, using different 
assumptions that a reasonable reader—whether a critic or defender—would find appropriate.  In 
this study, we present many different ways to approach earnings among drivers, so that informed 
readers can come to their own conclusions. 
 
Our Key Findings 
With those caveats, our median hourly wage estimates for Uber and Lyft drivers differ based on 
different assumptions.  
For instance, if you consider only full-time drivers, and count all their wait time, then hourly 
earnings have a median of $17.40/hour. Even with the most capacious definition of full-time, 
however, only 15% of drivers are full-time, so this model, while true for that 15%, is not valid for 
the rest of the drivers.  
Consider, instead, all the drivers, and count only their time preceding a ride, and the median 
hourly earnings rise to $23.25/hour. We highlight this number in the report because this 
number, $23.25, describes the median driver, who drives about 10 hours per week—not full-time. 
If you want to understand the average driver, $23.25 is the hourly earnings number you want to 
use. 
These numbers are not a range. One number is not true and the other false. Instead they are the 
result of different assumptions, which in turn are driven by different questions.  
For both numbers, the medians imply that half of drivers earn more than that number, and half 
earn less. (And as we will see below, significant numbers of drivers have hourly earnings quite 
different than the medians.) 
As noted above, what strikes us about these estimates how widely they vary. With just simple 
changes in the underlying assumptions, our estimates of hourly earnings increase by almost 35 
percent. The lower estimate of $17.40/hour reflects the following assumptions: 
• All drivers are full-time. 
• All wait time logged into the app counts 
as paid work, whether followed by a ride 
or not. 
• Drivers incur both marginal and fixed 
costs. 
• Costs include forgone returns to capital.
 
By contrast, the higher estimate of $23.25/hour depends on these assumptions:  
• Drivers may be casual, committed casual, 
part-time, or full-time. 
• Wait time only counts as paid work 
when followed by a ride. 
• Drivers incur only marginal costs.  
• Costs exclude forgone returns to capital.
 In the report, to explain these differences, we unpack these assumptions to show what they mean. 
In different contexts, depending on the specific research or policy question one is posing, both 
results are valid. 
Why So Much Variation? 
Most people know how to calculate an hourly wage. Sum a driver’s total earnings. Add up the 
total number of hours they worked. Divide total earnings by total hours. Problem solved. 
If only it were always that easy. For many jobs, it is, but not for TNC drivers. At least 
conceptually, we can still begin with hours worked and total earnings. But, even with those numbers 
in hand, we must still account for the costs of doing business, namely those arising from the 
purchase, operation, and maintenance of a vehicle. For example, costs are complicated by the fact 
that while they reduce gross earnings, some of that reduction will be offset by tax deductions. 
The tax treatment for independent contractors is not the same as that for employees, so if we 
begin to consider taxes, we need to do it for our employee benchmarking as well. If that were not 
enough, calculating any one of these four quantities individually for a given worker relies on a 
wide-range of assumptions. 
Hours Worked 
For conventional jobs, there is little argument over when work begins and ends. But for TNC 
drivers, reasonable people can disagree. Does work begin when a driver logs into the app and 
end when they log out? And, what if they are logged into two apps at once waiting to be offered 
a fare? What if they are logged into one app while already driving a passenger in the other?  
Alternatively, should pay start on the driver’s way to pick up a fare? Should it start when the 
driver arrives, and the passenger gets in the car to begin their journey? 
For our study, just to make it even more complicated, the City of Seattle wanted to know the 
hourly earnings of Seattle drivers. Yet important parts of the Seattle metro area are outside the 
city limits, like the airport. 
Total Earnings 
Relative to hours worked, earnings are straightforward. At the end of each work week, drivers 
receive a direct deposit from one or both TNCs, after the platforms take their cut. The itemization 
includes two categories—gross earnings and tips, the latter of which are passed through the app 
for the convenience of all parties. 
Because the TNCs consider their drivers to be independent contractors rather than employees (a 
hugely controversial designation increasingly subject to legislative and judicial scrutiny), Uber 
and Lyft do not deduct income taxes from these gross earnings. Instead, drivers receive a Form 
1099 at the end of the year and must pay the taxes on their own, including what some refer to as 
the “self-employment tax.” This is essentially the portion of social security and Medicare 
contributions paid by employers in a conventional employment arrangement. At the same time, 
because drivers are independent contractors, they have access to tax deductions that regular 
employees cannot take. 
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Our study does not address taxes, which is an important limitation that we hope to look at in the 
future. 
Costs of Doing Business 
In general, conventional employees need not consider costs of doing business because those are 
borne by their employer.  TNC drivers, though, do have costs of doing business. 
But, which costs count, and how should we compute them?  In the body of the report, we detail 
how we attempted to answer this double-barreled question correctly and fairly. Reasonable 
people can disagree over whether we accomplished this. Much of the difference comes down to 
how we believe drivers approach their work for Uber and Lyft. Is it a livelihood, or a “side hustle?” 
Once again, without triangulating our quantitative analysis with interviews, we cannot know 
with certainty. Unfortunately, the survey estimates we have seen to date are not reliable for this 
purpose because their samples are not representative. 
For TNC drivers, “marginal costs” are those incurred solely by virtue of driving for-hire.  On the 
one hand, to the extent one that TNC drivers use their own car to “pick up a few hours here and 
there,” it seems sensible to include only marginal costs as their costs of doing business. After all, 
the driver bought the car to use in his or her daily life. That said, these drivers do have additional 
costs for depreciation and maintenance that they would not incur if they were not driving for 
Uber or Lyft. We include these costs for all drivers. 
On the other hand, certainly some drivers essentially drive full-time for one or both TNCs.  
Perhaps these drivers purchased their car for the express purpose of for-hire passenger transport.  
In fact, maybe they would not own a car or drive at all but for their work as an Uber or Lyft 
driver.  These “fixed costs,” once borne, are independent of how many hours a driver drives.  For 
full-time drivers, it makes sense to adopt a more inclusive measure of costs. 
The costs of doing business, however, are not just expenses, but anticipated returns to 
investment—the returns to capital. This question is even more complicated. Drivers, like regular 
workers, supply their labor, for which they are paid a wage or salary. But TNC drivers, unlike 
normal workers, also “rent out” their own assets—namely, their own personal vehicle. In 
principle, this amount is already “baked in” to their weekly payment from the company, which is 
paying for both the drivers’ labor and car. The cost of the “returns to capital,” some fraction of 
which may go to the platform, for the driver are in excess of simply the day-to-day cost of the 
car. A good faith estimate of earnings per hour requires “netting out” the rental cost of capital 
from gross earnings. For full-time drivers, our cost model includes the cost of capital because 
rental companies will charge for their capital costs. For non-full-time drivers, we make no 
adjustment for capital returns in most of our calculations, but provide, in the full report, an easy 
way for readers to make this adjustment.  
Driver Types or Driver Engagement 
What the above approach to costing suggests is that our data could and should inform us on how 
“engaged” drivers are with each of the platforms. That is, how much do they drive for the TNCs?  
Once again, our data are uniquely equipped to answer this question, since they tell us the total 
amount of hours worked by a given driver across both platforms. Some drivers work relatively few 
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hours per week, which would make us comfortable treating them as more casually engaged, and 
thus, not expecting or entitled to “full costing.” Other drivers, though, appear to be engaged in 
full-time work, as seen by the number of hours driven they log. For these drivers, a more 
comprehensive measure of costs seems fair and appropriate. 
Drivers have a wide range of experiences. For different kinds of drivers, different cost models are 
more appropriate.  
The Variation Is As Important As the Average 
In a normal service economy job, at Starbucks, Wal-Mart or McDonald's, the variation in worker 
earnings is very low. For platform drivers, the opposite is true. 
Throughout the full report, we provide graphs known as histograms that show the percentage 
of drivers earning different amounts per hour. Consider below two histograms from the end of 
the report., Chart 6.7 and Chart 6.8. These histograms have some assumptions baked into them: 
only driver wait time that precedes a ride should be considered work time and that costs are 
limited to marginal costs. The point here is not about the assumptions, or even the average. The 
story here is about the spread. The way that histograms work is that the higher the bars are, the 
higher the percentage of drivers who earn that much per hour. Most of the bar height is in the 
middle, but there are a lot of bars further out. 
Here in Chart 6.7, for instance, right in the middle of the curve, is the $23.25 median that we 
discussed earlier. Simply eyeballing it, you can see that about 13% of drivers make about the 
median. So the vast majority of drivers (about 87%) earn either more or less than $23.25. Also 
notice how some drivers are making more than $40 per hour, and some are making less than $10 
per hour. That variation is very different from a normal job. Working at a Starbucks cash 
register, you will not earn $9 an hour while the person next to you earns $41 an hour. 
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Now consider Chart 6.8, also from the end of the report. It makes the same histogram again, but 
sorts it by different kinds of drivers, who are defined by the number of hours they spend on the 
platform. That grouping of drivers, again, depends on some assumptions. The story here is not 
just the medians of those different driver types (which don’t vary too much), but how different 
the variation is by driver type. The shapes of those histograms are shockingly different. Notice 
how spread out the casual drivers are in comparison to the drivers who spend more time on the 
platform.  
One reason why the full report is so long is that we believed it was important to have charts like 
these that reveal the variety of driver experiences, rather than one simple number. Such 
complexity makes for worse soundbites, but is necessary to understand driver earnings. 
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Where Does This Leave Us? 
Our analysis seeks to inform diverse stakeholders whom we expect to disagree with each other 
on what are reasonable assumptions when calculating the earnings of TNC drivers. We 
encourage readers and other users of our estimates to seriously consider which assumptions best 
fit the specific questions they seek to answer.  That said, a few specific policy concerns jump out 
to us: 
• Under the worst-case scenario for drivers—the lower estimate above—34% of full-time 
drivers earn less than the minimum wage. The question for platforms and policymakers is 
not whether some drivers make less than a minimum wage (in all our models, some do), but 
what is the best way to compute costs and time. However, that only changes the specific 
calculation, not the overall justification for a policy-prescribed wage floor. That wage floor 
should rely on shared definitions between government, drivers, and platforms. Determining 
those definitions and the associated data will require independent analysis.   
• Depending on how one thinks about driver wait time, which is further complicated by the 
practice of multi-apping, one can reasonably argue that waiting time goes uncompensated. 
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Driver advocates argue that time should all be considered work, while critics retort that 
unless that time leads to a ride it is not really work. A fitting answer to this question would 
require more data and more research. 
• Somewhat counterintuitively, hourly earnings are actually lower for full-time drivers than 
they are for casual, committed casual, and part-time drivers.  
o Looking under the hood, it turns out the difference stems entirely from costing 
assumptions. Yet these “assumptions” are not arbitrary. As drivers commit more 
hours to platform driving, they must inevitably begin to consider more than marginal 
costs. Fixed costs and returns to capital accounted for the in the fixed cost model drive 
down hourly earnings.  
o The incorporation of these additional costs may explain the relatively few full-time 
platform drivers in Seattle. Even using the most expansive definition of full-time, 32 
hours a week and including all wait time, only 15% of drivers would be included. It 
could be that platform driving simply doesn’t make good sense once you include fixed 
costs, which the more you drive, become a reasonable inclusion. 
o Policymakers and TNCs may want to address this anomaly, which only became 
apparent with the analysis afforded by the fine-grained administrative data. Again, 
this finding could also be a result of restricting our analysis to the City of Seattle 
rather than the larger metro area. More research should be conducted to find out 
whether this is a result of that spatial restriction or an accurate picture of drivers. 
• Since TNC drivers work as independent contractors, they receive no employer-provided 
benefits. Aside from missing out on tax-advantaged health insurance and retirement savings 
(which are, it must be pointed out, also generally absent for comparable service economy 
work), they have no access to sick leave, unemployment insurance, or workers’ compensation. 
Likewise, they are generally left unprotected by labor and employment regulations, including 
wage and hour laws (though, again, many service sectors workers do not enjoy their full labor 
rights either). At minimum, this implies that TNC drivers’ wages should actually be a bit 
more than otherwise comparable employed people to account for this difference. More 
importantly, it suggests that companies like Uber and Lyft should either pay a larger share 
of the state’s social welfare bill and perhaps should advocate for increased taxes in exchange 
for disconnecting crucial social welfare benefits from employment altogether. Or, 
alternatively, policymakers may find a new way to address these needs outside of traditional 
structures, perhaps through a portable benefits model. In the end, however, fairness suggests 
that drivers need the same kind of security afforded to other workers—if not more. 
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Key Findings 
 
   
• The median driver earned, after expenses, $23.25 per hour, close to the Seattle median 
hourly earnings of $25.45, and more than the median hourly of taxi drivers ($16.81). 
• 9 in 10 drivers made more per hour than the average taxi driver ($16.81), even after 
expenses. 
• 92% of drivers make more than the Seattle minimum wage ($16.39) even after deducting 
expenses. 
• 96% of drivers drove less than 40 hours per week, including driver wait time on the app. 
31% less than 5 hours. 
• For every ten dollars drivers grossed, they had, on average, one dollar in expenses. 
• Only a third of drivers use both Lyft and Uber 
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Executive Summary 
In this study we use the complete set of ride records for both Lyft 
and Uber for one week in Seattle to estimate driver earnings and 
hours. We merge the data from the two companies to understand 
how drivers’ use of two platforms (multi-apping) affected their 
earnings. We also examine how different definitions of P1— that 
time after drivers turn on an app, but before they drive to pick up a 
passenger—affect hourly earnings. With access to such granular 
platform data, our study moves beyond averages to examine the 
distribution of drivers’ hours and earnings. We place these results in 
context, by benchmarking the results against other Seattle workers.  
The results surprised us.  
From anecdotes, interviews, and surveys, we had the impression 
that the majority of drivers are underpaid and work full-time. We find 
that while such drivers certainly exist, the vast majority of drivers do 
not fit that description. For most drivers, platform driving is a side-
job, with hourly earnings, while not stellar are about average for 
Seattle—and above average for comparable service-economy jobs. We acknowledge, however, that our approach 
through much of this report, does not take into account any return to drivers, their returns to capital, for providing use of 
their cars in addition to driving services (though we do account for drivers’ costs). 
In this report, we discuss different reasonable ways to think about and calculate both time and costs. Yet, even with some 
expansive definitions of driver time, our data paints a different picture than the conventional wisdom.  
$25.45 
$23.25 
$16.83 
$16.81 
$15.51 
$14.59 
$14.16 
Cooks, fast food
Seattle, All Occupations
Platform Drivers
Counter and rental clerks
Taxi drivers and chauffeurs
Retail salespersons
Cashiers
Seattle median hourly earnings among benchmark jobs
$
Earnings - Costs 
Driving time 
= Hourly Earnings 
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Using our preferred estimate, the median driver earned $23.25 per 
hour after expenses. For some readers, these hourly earnings may 
seem low, but, even after expenses, nine in ten platform drivers made 
more per hour than the average employee taxi driver ($16.81).  
Platform drivers earned, after marginal costs, close to the Seattle 
median for all occupations ($25.45). Platform drivers, instead of being 
underpaid, earn about average.   
Considering earnings as a full-time driver is useful for comparisons 
with other workers but is not useful for understanding how drivers 
actually spend their time. Platform drivers were overwhelmingly not 
full-time drivers: 96% of drivers drove less than 40 hours per week, 
including driver wait time on the app. 31% of drivers drove less than 5 
hours. Using Washington’s definition of full-time, 32 hours a week, 
only 10% of drivers drove full-time.  
Our results suggest that platforms offer drivers a way to make 
additional money in whatever time they have in their schedule. Their 
hourly earnings are not exceptional, but neither are they terrible—
they are about average for Seattle. 
Percentage of drivers by weekly hours
%
31%
44%
13%
8%
4% 100%
Weekly Hours
100
5 to 20 hours
> 40 hours
30 to 40 hours
20 to 30 hours
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Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to understand platform drivers’ hourly earnings in Seattle. The answer is much more 
complicated than it might appear at first glance.  You might think that to get that number you can simply divide earnings by 
time, like in a normal workplace. For app-based drivers, however, that workplace is harder to define. Drivers can turn the 
app on, whether or not they are actually working. To further complicate matters, drivers can have Lyft activated on one 
phone, while driving through Uber on another phone—or even DoorDash. These apps allow drivers to combine multiple 
workplaces at once, in a truly novel way. To understand drivers’ earnings, and to contrast those earnings with comparable 
benchmarks, requires us to examine how we think about when work begins and when it ends. As more Americans 
workers find themselves combining multiple income streams across platforms, this study is an attempt to understand how 
that combination of platforms affects workers’ earnings. 
Good policy relies on good analysis. This study should be useful to policymakers and the public, we believe, because the 
hours and earnings of platform drivers have been analyzed by an independent, reputable third-party with direct access to 
the lowest-level microdata.1 The results derive not from a survey or from aggregate statistics, but from data on every 
driver for the two major platforms in Seattle, taken directly from administrative records. We hope that policymakers, as 
they move forward, will find this report and subsequent studies on this dataset useful to help understand an important part 
of the changing nature of work in Seattle.  
For the study, both platforms provided time and earnings data about their drivers. Cornell’s data repositories at the 
CRADC (Cornell Restricted Access Data Center) in New York provided data security. Each platform provided a complete 
record of each driver’s logged data for a week, as well as the week’s earnings. In these data, each driver has a unique, 
yet anonymized, identifier that allows researchers to merge time records without being able to identify the drivers 
personally. These merged data provide a complete time account of every driver in Seattle for that week across the two 
                                            
1 The study entered planning at the end of 2019. Seattle policymakers were interested in learning whether platform drivers were adequately 
compensated via research conducted independently of in-house independent Uber and Lyft analysis. At the same time, Uber and Lyft sought to 
protect their sensitive data from public disclosure and to have the analysis performed by a party independent of local policy involvement. Thus, 
Uber and Lyft approached Louis Hyman, director of the Institute for Workplace Studies at the ILR School of Cornell University, about doing a time 
and earnings study.  
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platforms, which neither platform could know. Researchers could know how drivers actually spent their time across two 
different platforms using internal administrative data. At no time did either platform have access to the merged data set. 
The merged microdata makes possible much more accurate analysis than was previously possible.  
• Deduplication: In previous studies, researchers had to rely on the aggregated statistics of Uber and Lyft, 
which included the time that drivers waited for a ride (P1). For drivers that used both apps, these waiting 
periods overlapped. Since each individual platform did not know the state of the other platform, the time 
reported was the sum of these multiple times. In this report, we have eliminated this overlap. 
• Cost Analysis: In previous studies, researchers often needed to use approximations for the types of cars, 
ages of cars, and mileages of cars. In this study we use actual drivers’ cars, which allows us to model the 
actual composition of the platform driving fleet. Driver car microdata matters a great deal because the 
Seattle platform driver fleet differs significantly from the U.S. as a whole, and that whole U.S. fleet is used to 
calculate often misused depreciation numbers like the I.R.S. mileage deduction. Because of this specificity, 
we were able to use the actual prices of cars in Seattle to estimate depreciation. We used the same data 
source that the state of Washington uses to calculate vehicle taxation.   
• Statistical Weaknesses: Perhaps most significantly, previous researchers relied on averages of 
aggregated statistics, like “hours driven” and “weekly earnings” which have implications for errors in 
subsequent calculations. 
o Jensen’s Inequality: These numbers, in and of themselves, are not wrong, but every time a 
researcher computed a ratio with them, like “weekly earnings” divided by “hours driven” in order to 
calculate what they think is ‘earnings per hour’, they ran up against a bias problem that can be 
explained by Jensen’s Inequality.2 As discussed later, Jensen’s Inequality is a mathematical property 
of estimated ratios that biases the results downwards. Ratios calculated from averages, like ‘earnings 
per hour’, will tend to be lower than reality simply because of the mathematical properties of 
averages. In our study, since we have actual individual driver data, we can take the averages of the 
ratios, which has no bias in the estimation. 
o Means of Skewed Distributions: It is well known that means are a poor measure of central tendency 
for right skewed distributions since the large data values pull the estimate upward. The downward 
                                            
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratio_estimator 
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bias mentioned above is further exacerbated when one divides by a mean calculated from right 
skewed data since there is additional downward bias. 
o Imputation: Previous researchers used imputed numbers of hours driving because of complications in 
determining company-specific working time when a driver uses more than one platform when using 
aggregated data. Aggregating imputed working time across app platforms by driver likely inflate P1 
times. Our analysis with the micro data, rather than aggregated data, uses actual times that can 
explicitly account for the multiple apps and can deal with the deduplication of the P1 times.  
Furthermore, the imputed number of hours are means calculated from right skewed data, so the 
downward bias issues mentioned above cannot be controlled. The biases of the imputation cannot be 
corrected. 
Independence 
This study ran through the Office of Sponsored Research at Cornell, which oversees all grant-funded research at the 
university. The researchers received total academic freedom in the analysis. No member of Uber or Lyft was on the team 
doing the analysis, unlike the case in some earlier studies. The researchers could publish the results of the study 
regardless of the results, in both this report and subsequently in peer-reviewed journals. Though Uber and Lyft covered 
the costs of the study (as is common in academic research), no member of the team received any additional 
compensation (except the students who were paid out of the grant money). The study was priced as cost-plus, which 
covered the costs of the research plus overhead to the university. In total, study costs came to $120,000. 
Data 
Source 
Driver earnings for all of our analyses came directly from Lyft and Uber.  They provided week-level earnings data, 
including tips, for every driver in Seattle. The population includes 14,109 unique drivers with over 3.2 million state 
transitions. Every time a driver transitioned between periods, such as from P1 to P2, we received a time-stamped 
observation. The time-stamped data consisted of records for all platform logons and rides originating in Seattle on these 
two platforms for the week of October 7 to October 14, 2019.   
This week was chosen because in November 2019 the city of Seattle asked Uber and Lyft for data for the first week of 
each month. We used this particular week because it was the most recent week when we started this project. It did not 
have a holiday or a major event. The week was unusually cold, but aside from that, it was a completely normal week. 
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Privacy 
We use hashed driver license numbers to merge records from the two companies, while maintaining the anonymity of the 
drivers.  
Data Validation 
Using statistical methods developed for forensic accounting, we checked for fabricated data. We found no evidence of 
fabricated data. 
The week chosen for analysis was not cherry-picked from a year of data but was the most recent week in a long series of 
weeks supplied to the city of the Seattle.  
Method 
We then aggregated the period times for each driver and matched the drivers with their weekly earnings from both 
platforms. We then performed standard statistical analyses. We used median rather than mean in most analyses because 
we wanted to exclude the extreme outliers in the data set.  Some of the regression analyses used means, but generally 
we used quantile regression to estimate the median. 
Definitions 
Interpreting Results 
Interpretation of the results of this study requires understanding a few statistical terms. For your convenience, a glossary 
has been provided in the Appendix. 
Hours 
When we use “hours” in this study, it is always weekly hours, not daily, monthly or annual. The basic unit of analysis for 
this study is the week. 
Earnings and Hourly Earnings 
Throughout this study, we refer to earnings and hourly earnings. For this study, we received each driver’s earnings and 
tips from each platform. We then calculated different measurements of how long that driver worked during that week (as 
discussed below in Times Periods). We then divided those earnings by the hours of work to calculate hourly earnings. 
Hourly earnings are the dollars earned for an hour of work.  
We did not break out tips separately from earnings in every calculation but have provided tip data in tables below. 
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Time Periods 
The ride-sharing industry uses a shorthand convention to talk about time. Driving times include four components, as 
follows 
• P0—when the app is off 
• P1—when the app is on, but a ride has not been accepted 
• P2—when driving to pick up passengers 
• P3—when passengers are in the vehicle 
While both platforms know the data for their own platform, they do not know what else drivers are doing at the same time. 
As is well-known, drivers can have both apps on at the same time, which is known as “multi-homing” or “multi-apping.” 
The P1 time visible to both platforms then could be actual time drivers wait for a ride, or it could be time when the driver is 
on the other platform—or doing something else entirely. Drivers cannot be in P3 for both platforms at once, but we do find 
cases with drivers in P2 for one platform while completing a ride (in P3) for another platform. The intersection of data, 
especially for the 1/3 of drivers who drive on both platforms, whom we call multi-app drivers, is very important in 
considering how we think about driver earnings and time. This study then can eliminate the overlap in time periods—
deduplication—which is especially important in thinking about P1 time. 
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Period Description Car PassengerApp
P2 driving to pick 
up passengers
P3 passengers are 
in the vehicle
P0 the app is off
P1 the app is on, 
but no 
passenger
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The Unconventional Nature of P1 Time  
P1 time is the most controversial of the periods to consider because P1 challenges our conventional notions of work. 
When does work begin? For a regular job, the answer is easy: when I arrive at the workplace the job begins. For ride-
sharing the answer is more complicated because even after the app is on, we don’t know what the driver is doing.  
The complication emerges because we typical think of work time as exclusive. That is, a person can’t perform two tasks at 
exactly the same time.  
P1 time could be spent patiently waiting for a passenger on the app, driving through another platform, working another 
job, or just watching YouTube. Should that time not picking up or driving a passenger be considered work? The driver 
might simply have the app on while doing something else or wait patiently for hours for a ride that never comes: we simply 
don’t know right now and hope to explore that more in future studies. 
Deduplicating P1 
As work time is exclusive time, we have deduplicated, unless otherwise noted, the data. Time spent in P2 for Lyft should 
not, at the same time, count as P1 for Uber, or vice versa. In this study, when we “deduplicate” the data, we do not count 
P1 on another platform while the driver is in P2 or P3 on the other. Similarly, we do not double-count P1 when a driver has 
both apps on.  
This deduplication of P1 time would not be possible by either Lyft or Uber, since they do not know when drivers are using 
the other platform. They do not know which drivers use multiple apps, and do not know how long drivers overlap.  
Because they are unable to deduplicate P1 time, for anti-trust reasons, any P1 data that platforms have provided in the 
past necessarily overestimates the total amount of P1 time because of multi-apping by some drivers.  
Upper and Lower Bounds on Hours 
Reasonable people can disagree on how to think about P1 time, which necessarily determines the how we calculate 
hourly earnings. In this report, we offer three versions of P1 that represent an upper bound on hourly rates, a lower bound 
on hourly rates, and what we think is a reasonable middle ground on hourly rates. We provide these separate analyses so 
that readers can see the impact and choose among the options.  
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Section 2: No Waiting 
If you think that waiting time should not count at all, then you should drop all P1. This view would be held by 
readers who believe that any time not spent picking up or driving a passenger should not be considered work. In 
this study, the section called “P1 No Waiting” examines hours and earnings from this point of view.  
Section 3: Waiting 
If you think that any P1 time should be included, regardless of what is happening, then you should count all P1 time 
(excluding only that time that would be double-counted on two platforms). In this study, we call this version of “P1 
All”. We believe this measure of P1 might be too inclusive for some readers, since it would include commute time 
or time that might be used in other ways. We include this analysis for readers who consider all time when the app is 
on to be work time, regardless of whether a spell results in picking a rider up. 
Section 4: Preceding Ride 
If you think that only P1 time that precedes a ride should be considered work, then you would include only P1 time 
that is immediately followed by P2 time (driving to get a rider). The concept is that during this time, we have 
evidence that the driver was clearly waiting to pick someone up. In this case, you should drop any P1 time that did 
not precede a ride. In this study, we call this version “P1 Preceding Ride.”  
We prefer this measure of P1. In this measurement, we include the first ride of the day, which could easily be 
commuting time. We do this because unlike conventional work, drivers may hop on or hop off the app throughout 
the day. Commuting to work is not as a clear for ridesharing as it is for other kinds of work. This inclusion pushes 
our P1 Preceding Ride hourly earnings lower. Nonetheless, we think this is the right metric to use.  
This definition of P1 Preceding Ride is more expansive than how ride-sharing platforms typically define P1, since it 
could include initial commute time, and makes no allowance for how long the P1 period is before a ride is accepted. 
It would not however, include commute time to return home if the driver left the app on for the drive. 
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Period
P1, Logged, 
Duplicated
P1, Logged, 
Deduplicated
P1, Before Rides, 
Deduplicated
Description
All logged P1 time across both 
platforms
All logged P1 time removing 
double-counted time
P1 time before a ride, removing 
double-counted time
Periods included
P1:P0, P1:Rejected, 
P1:P2, P1:P3
P1:P0, P1:Rejected, 
P1:P2, P1:P3
P1:P2, P1:P3
Problem
Double counts time when driver 
is in P1 on both platforms
Includes P1 time that does not 
lead to a ride (unproductive)
None
  
Section 1: Defining Driving in Seattle     27 
Measuring Deduplication 
In the following Charts 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, we show how the elimination of duplicated time across platforms reduces P1. 
There is no effect, of course, for single-app drivers.  Note also that casual drivers disproportionately tend to be single-app 
users.  
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Chart 1.1: Median P1 by different definitions of P1
hours
Adding up all the logged P1 
time, duplicated, and whether 
or not it led to a ride, leads to a 
median P1 of 4.6 hours.
Eliminating duplicated time 
across platforms, reduces P1 
to 4.0
Including only P1 time that 
preceded a ride reduces P1 to 
2.8 hours.
4.6
4.0
2.8
P1 Time (All Drivers)
-1.2
-0.6
P1 Deduplicated, Logged
P1 Duplicated, Logged
P1 Deduplicated, Preceding Ride
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Chart 1.2: Median P1 by different definitions of P1 by app-use
hours
4.6
7.5
3.5
4.0
5.0
3.5
2.8
3.4
2.4
P1 (All Drivers) P1 Time (Multi-App) P1 (Single-App)
-33%
P1 Duplicated, Logged
P1 Deduplicated, Preceding Ride
P1 Deduplicated, Logged
Data from both 
platforms 
allows us to 
account for 
overlap in non-
passenger 
waiting time.
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Chart 1.3: Median P1 by different definitions of P1 by driver type
hours
4.6
0.9
4.5
11.5
17.7
4.0
0.8
3.9
9.7
14.8
2.8
0.4
2.8
8.0
12.9
P1 (All Drivers) Committed 
Casual
Full-TimeCasual Part-Time
-17%
P1 Duplicated, Logged
P1 Deduplicated, Logged
P1 Deduplicated, Preceding Ride
Any calculations 
about “full-time” 
drivers that 
cannot 
deduplicate will 
substantially 
overestimate P1 
time.
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Drivers 
One advantage of this study is our ability to examine driver experiences across platforms. Neither company knew before 
the study which of its drivers also drove on the other, and still do not. With this information, we can compare drivers’ 
weekly hours, earnings, and platform choice. 
Driver Types 
In our analysis, we divide the drivers into four categories that reflect different levels of engagement. 
Our four categories of drivers, as seen in Chart 1.4 and Table 1.4, are defined by the number of hours that they drove in 
Seattle, excluding P1 time. That is, we cut the population into four groups by hours driven in P2+P3 time. The percentiles 
(0-25%, 25-75%, 75-95%, and 95-100%) roughly, but not exactly correspond to conventional definitions of work 
commitment.  
Since we are allowing for different definitions of P1, defining driver categories by including P1 would not allow for easy 
comparison across definitions. By using P2+P3, which is not controversial, we have a stable definition. 
We also know that some readers would prefer to have a sense of the breakdown of driver time by the different definitions 
of P1 used in this report. In Chart 1.5 and 1.6, below, we show the percentage of drivers in different bins. In Chart 1.7, we 
illustrate the breakdown of time by driver type. In Chart 1.8, we show a histogram of drivers’ weekly hours, broken down in 
5 hour increments. 
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Table 1.4: Hours and earnings by driver type (P2 + P3)
%; hours; $
Type Driver Percentage
Median 
Hours 
(P2+P3)
Median 
Weekly Pay
Full-Timer 5% 31.0 $1,162.88 
Part-Timer 20% 18.7 $689.59 
Committed 
Casual 50% 6.9 $254.28 
Casual 25% 1.2 $43.90 
All 100% 6.9 $254.04
25%
50%
20%
5%
Drivers
Full-Time 100%
Part-Time
Committed Casual
Casual
Chart 1.4: Driver types as percentage of 
all drivers
%
  
Section 1: Defining Driving in Seattle     33 
 
Chart 1.5: Percentage of drivers by hours, by measurement metric 
%
40%
27% 31%
47%
44%
44%
10%
15% 13%
9% 8%
5% 4% 100%
100
All logged time, 
deduplicated (P1 
All + P2 + P3)
Only time picking up 
or driving passengers 
(P2 + P3)
0%3%
Only time leading to 
rides, and the rides 
themselves (P1+P2+P3)
100100
> 40 hours
30 to 40 hours
0 to 5 hours
20 to 30 hours
5 to 20 hours
For example, 
31% of drivers 
work 0 to 5 
hours per 
week
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Chart 1.6: Percentage of drivers by hours, by measurement metric 
%
98%
85% 90%
15% 10%
2%
Section 4: P1+P2+P3Section 3: P1 All + P2 +P3
100
Section 2: P2+P3
100%
100100
>32 hours
<32 hours
In the state of 
Washington, 
32 hours is the 
boundary for 
full-time work.
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1
44
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Chart 1.7: Median weekly hours by period by driver type
#
P1
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Chart 1.8: Percent of drivers with hours driven (P1+P2+P3)
hours
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Earnings 
Throughout the study we have added together drivers’ earnings from tips and from platforms, except where otherwise 
noted. All earnings are for one week in Seattle. 
Regardless of the different measurements of time, the weekly earnings necessarily remain the same.  
The median share of platform earnings that came from was 8 percent, as seen in Table 1.9. 
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Table 1.9: Platform earnings, tip earnings (one week)
$, %
Type
Platform 
Earnings 
(median)
Tip Earnings 
(median)
Tip Ratio 
(median)
Casual $43.90 $3.00 7.7%
Committed 
Casual $254.28 $20.71 8.3%
Part-Timer $689.59 $56.33 8.1%
Full-Timer $1162.88 $93.87 8.0%
All $254.04 $20.64 8.1%
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Multi-apping and Single-apping  
The mix of drivers across platforms, as seen in Chart 1.10, is also an important policy question, since it might be the case 
if one platform were significantly different in earnings, hours, or market share from the other. For anti-trust reasons, this 
report has not commented on platform-level earnings data.  
In Seattle, the app-use of drivers is ⅔ single-app and ⅓ multi-app. Drivers that drove only for Lyft or Uber, as seen in 
Table 1.11, were roughly evenly divided. 
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15%
36%
43% 47%
33%
85%
64%
57% 53%
67%
Casual Casual 
Committed
Part-Time Full-Time All
100%
Single-App
Multi-App
Chart 1.10: Driver app use by driver type
%
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Type Count Percentage
Only Uber 5,215 37%
Only Lyft 4,291 30%
Both Uber and 
Lyft
4,603 33%
Table 1.11: Platform mix of drivers
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Weighting by Drivers vs. Weighting by Hours 
In this study we emphasize the driver as the basic unit of analysis. Other studies emphasize hours driving or miles driven. 
In doing so, they deemphasize the experience of drivers who spend less time on the platform. We do not discount the 
different experiences of more committed drivers, but also believe that drivers who participate less also matter, especially 
as they make up the vast majority of drivers. 
For readers who wonder if our results would differ if they were weighted by hours driving (emphasizing more committed 
drivers over more casual drivers), we recalculate some key statistics. The answer is no. The results do not change. 
These reveal that such weights do not meaningfully alter the medians. For instance, the median gross hourly earnings of 
drivers (only using P2+P3) is $36.31.  If we instead weight that calculation by hours, using P1+P2+P3, emphasizing the 
hourly earnings of more committed drivers, the median changes to $36.71, which is a negligible rise of 1.1%. Using 
another hour weight, P1 All + P2 + P3, produces a similar result of $36.76, or a rise of 1.2%. In this study we do not 
general use means (since the distributions are so skewed) but we found the same effect on means. We also find only 
small shifts in other keys statistics using hour weights. Since hours are proportional to miles, we see the same effect if we 
reweight by miles. 
 
Costs: Marginal Costs, Fixed Costs and Asset Rental  
Another challenging area for estimating drivers’ earnings are costs. Drivers supply two services through the platform: their 
labor as drivers, and their car as an asset. Drivers can own the car, but they can also rent the car (though car rental on a 
regular basis is more expensive than ownership). These distinctions matter because as drivers earning a return on their 
labor, they can be easily compared to normal wage-earners. As car owners, however, they are also renting access to their 
capital (or renting a car, and then rerenting it). As drivers, the marginal costs matter. As owners, the fixed costs matter.  
Conceptually, the two components of costs are marginal costs and fixed costs, but in this case fixed costs should be seen 
as the cost for on-going access to the car itself, not the operation of the car (marginal costs). To that end, we use car 
rental as the fixed cost, which incorporates both the on-going cost of a fixed asset (maintenance, financing, depreciation, 
etc.) as well as the market rate for a return to capital (since the rental car agency demands a profit on every car rented). In 
other studies that used “average costs,” we believe this was an indirect way to approximate the return on capital. With 
access to the actual cars, we can more directly differentiate the driver component of costs (marginal costs) and the owner 
component of costs (fixed costs). 
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We begin by considering marginal costs. As is standard in economic analysis, we see platform drivers as earning 
additional dollars for their work, or as economists usually say, marginal revenue. Similarly, for drivers’ direct costs, a 
marginal perspective is appropriate. Nearly all drivers (96%) drive less than what is conventionally understood as full-time 
(40 hours). Our marginal cost model starts from the premise that driving in Seattle is a mostly side job, as the data 
confirm.3   
For marginal costs we include additional costs associated with driving for the platforms. The question we ask about any 
car-related cost is, “does this cost increase because the driver drives on the platform?” If the answer is no, then the cost is 
not marginal to driving for a platform. Instead it is as incurred a fixed cost of car ownership. If the answer is yes, then the 
cost should be considered a marginal cost. The benefit to the driver on a platform is the difference between the marginal 
revenue from driving minus the marginal costs they incur. 
As drivers spend more time on the platforms, their sense of costs becomes less like a driver focused on marginal cost, 
and more like an owner, focused on fixed costs. For the casual driver, car ownership is just a sunk cost. They already own 
the car. They already pay the fixed costs. For the full-time driver, who is making a choice to drive full-time, they are 
making a choice to incur the fixed costs through the platform.  
As a particularly germane, example consider platform drivers in New York City compared to those in Seattle. Relatively 
few New Yorker City families (45 percent) own cars, compared to Seattle where 81 percent own.4 Furthermore, 60 
percent of New York City platform drivers drive 32 hours per week or more, according to the Parrot & Reich study. In our 
Seattle data set, only 12 percent drive 30 hours or more. That is, many more Seattle drivers drive casually and have 
family cars already.   
These two factors (high rates of car ownership and casual drivership) suggest that it is important to focus on which car-
related costs are truly marginal costs for platform drivers in Seattle. These will be different from the additional costs 
                                            
3 Studies of New York City reveal that drivers there tend to be overwhelmingly full-time (Parrot & Reich: 2018). The story in Seattle appears to be 
different. 
4 https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/data/seattles-rate-of-car-ownership-saw-the-biggest-drop-among-big-u-s-cities-by-far/; 
https://edc.nyc/article/new-yorkers-and-their-cars; In NYC that ownership is heavily concentrated on Staten Island and the far outer boroughs.  
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incurred by a typical platform driver in places like New York City. If the drivers are as full-time as Parrot & Reich estimate, 
then car ownership is not a sunk cost, but a necessary additional cost. 
In Seattle, we consider the following as marginal costs for most platform drivers: fuel costs, depreciation due to mileage, 
maintenance due to mileage, and insurance. Both platforms include insurance, even in P1, for drivers while they are 
driving through the platform, so the cost for that insurance is zero.5 Previous studies generally include insurance, but 
Seattle’s regulations, since 2014, require platforms to maintain insurance on behalf of drivers.6 If drivers chose to get 
supplementary insurance, that would be their prerogative—and many drivers do— but it is not strictly necessary for driving 
on the platform, and we did not include that cost.7 This approach excludes fixed costs that would be incurred regardless of 
platform driving activity. The fixed costs we exclude are include purchasing the car, personal insurance, car financing 
costs, registration costs, and annual depreciation.  
We excluded a few fees for simplicity’s sake. For instance, we excluded the for-hire permit required in the City of Seattle. 
Total annual costs are $145.25.8 The per week cost of that would be $2.78, which would not change any of the results in 
any meaningful fashion.   
Returns to capital and imputed rent 
Drivers earnings are different than an employee’s in a particularly way: they either own or rent the cars that they are 
driving, which means they are supplying production assets.  These assets have an implicit value, what economists call 
imputed rent. In other studies, researchers have emphasized drivers’ average costs, rather than differentiating between 
marginal and fixed costs. For casual drivers, using average costs neglects the ways that car ownership is already a sunk 
cost. Yet that car usage still has a value. Particularly for the very casual driver, these costs can be hard to identify, and 
                                            
5 https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/insurance/ 
6 The quality of this insurance during P2 and P3 seems to be more than most personal insurance policies, but less than a typical insurance policy 
during P1.  
7 In our research into rideshare insurance, it seems that while some drivers have a marginal increase in premiums ($10-20 per month) others 
found, like our research assistant, that their premiums actually would fall. 
8 https://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/records-licensing/licensing/taxi-for-hire-transportation-networks/driver/application-fees.aspx; 
https://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-tncs/transportation-network-companies/tnc-drivers#penaltiesandappeals 
  
Section 1: Defining Driving in Seattle     45 
easy to ignore. As drivers drive longer hours, it becomes evident that drivers are in some sense renting out their car as 
well as their labor.  
If the asset is otherwise idle, it could be thought as having a zero opportunity cost, but as soon as it is driven, the asset 
has value made possible by both the driver and the platform.  
If the driver only earned the opportunity cost of their labor, such as a minimum wage or a taxi driver wage, then all the 
returns to capital would go to the platforms. If the drivers earn more than that wage, as we show in this report, then the 
returns to capital, the imputed rent, are being shared between the driver and the platform.  
Full-time drivers might be considered differently, and we incorporate this perspective on imputed rents in our fixed-cost 
model.9  For the small number of drivers who do drive full-time, including fixed costs might be appropriate. That is, they 
may buy and maintain a specific car that is used mostly for work.  In the section on costs and net income, we include in a 
model for full-time drivers that accounts for the cost of full-time access to a car. We base this estimate on the weekly 
rental cost of a car.10 This model is the maximum possible cost for the minimum possible car. This max-min allows us to 
estimate not the actual costs for full-time drivers (as we do with marginal costs for everyone else) but the highest possible 
costs for full-time drivers. This estimate, then, includes total replacement costs, which critics might argue should be 
included for drivers. Our results from the fixed, full-time model, then, should be read as the lower bound on full-time 
earnings, but completely incorporating the returns to asset ownership.  
                                            
9 Early report readers, who wished to remain anonymous, offered us several objections. An objection that we have heard is that drivers choose 
more expensive cars than they otherwise would have bought. Our analysis is only for the entry-level drivers (like UberX) not the larger cars. If a 
driver bought a more expensive car than is necessary to drive on the platform, reasonably, those additional costs should not be included. Other 
early readers also suggested that we include “full replacement cost” for every car, pro-rated by the time spent on the platform. Incorporating 
“replacement cost”, they argued, would allow for a sustainable long-term platform engagement. Incorporating fixed costs are not how, we believe, 
casual drivers do think or should think about costs. Moreover, depreciation costs due to mileage account for the loss of value in a car due to 
driving. At the end of a car’s life, there would be a recouped price that would be the difference between the total depreciation and the original 
value. Replacement costs, then, would be any cost in excess of the total depreciation + the recoup price, like transaction costs.  In usual 
circumstances, businesses realize their depreciation costs during the replacement. In our accounting, and in tax filings, such depreciation costs 
can be accounted for over time.  If, still, you believe that the total cost of car should be replaced, we still account for those costs in the full-time 
fixed cost model.  
 
10 https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/vehicle-solutions/hertz/ 
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As expected, the lower bound of the median net hourly rate for full-time drivers falls when more costs are included. 
Instead of earning a median net rate of $23.70, full-time drivers using the fixed cost model earn a median lower-bound net 
rate of $18.06. One of the surprising findings for us in this study was the relatively low share of full-time drivers. We note 
that the low share of full-time drivers could well reflect the low net earnings they receive when accounting for all the fixed 
costs of investing in and operating a car. 
This leads to the second consideration: returns for the use of cars. All drivers, whether full-time or casual, use their car (or 
perhaps a rented one) to provide services to the platforms’ riders. Thus, policy intended to regulate the terms and 
conditions of work by platform drivers should consider now to account for the value of cars’ services. Using only marginal 
costs omits that component.  
Incorporating imputed rent for more casual drivers can be done as well, but again, it remakes the hourly earnings 
numbers from their actuaI averages into lower bounds on their averages. Again we can use rental cost as a first 
approximation for this adjustment. In many comparable cities, but not Seattle, it is possible to rent a car to drive on a 
platform for $4 per hour.11 Hourly rentals are the highest possible rental price, and includes fixed costs (insurance, 
maintenance, depreciation, replacement, returns on capital, etc.) 
If a reader would like to adjust for imputed rent, it is not as simple as deducting $4 from hourly earnings. As fully 
compensated asset owners, like the rental car company, the costs of assets would then need to be remove, or there 
would be double counting. We would need to add back in the cost of maintenance and depreciation as in the fixed cost 
model. Maintenance and depreciation costs per mile are about $0.10. Using median percentages spent in P1, P2, and P3, 
we get a maintenance and depreciation per hour of $1.41. As we subtract $4 per hour, we must then add back in $1.41 
per hour, for a total of $2.59. If you would like to compensate for the imputed rent, subtract $2.59 from each cost estimate, 
except for the fixed cost model for the full-time drivers.  
We would like to further explore these returns to capital in a future paper. More research is needed, though, to establish a 
more precise measure of the appropriate return to drivers for use of their cars.                 
  
                                            
11 https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/vehicle-solutions/getaround/ 
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Definition • Additional cost for one more unit of 
production (like driving a passenger)
• Costs incurred regardless of 
production, like owning a car.
So What? • Cost only occurs if a driver uses platform
• Economists agree that decisions are made by the 
comparison of marginal revenue vs marginal cost (not 
average cost which includes fixed costs).
• No additional fixed cost for any additional driving.
• Really big costs included in other models, like car 
ownership, should be considered fixed costs.
Example 
Costs
• Mileage depreciation
• Maintenance per mile
• Fuel per mile
• Platform driving insurance (which is 
free for all drivers in P1, P2, or P3)
• Car Financing
• Annual depreciation
• Car registration
• Personal Insurance
What if? • If the driver did not drive through the platform, then 
the cost would not be incurred, like gas costs.
• If the driver did not drive through the platform, then 
the costs would still be incurred, like car ownership.
Implication • Marginal costs should be included for all drivers.• Fixed costs should only be included if the cost would 
not have occurred unless the driver was committed 
to platform driving. 
• That is, fixed costs should not be included unless a 
full-time driver.
Fixed Costs Marginal Costs
Table 1.12: Distinguishing fixed and marginal costs
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Benchmarking 
Platform drivers choose that form of work (at least temporarily) over their other labor market opportunities.  
To put these earnings in context, a reasonable starting point would be comparing the earnings of platform drivers to taxi 
drivers (and perhaps chauffeurs), to other typical service-economy jobs, and as well as to average earners in Seattle. 
In this report, we use median taxi driver hourly earnings ($16.81) and the Seattle minimum wage ($16.39) as yardsticks 
against which to compare platform drivers’ hourly earnings. The taxi driver data we use, as discussed below, is for taxi 
drivers and chauffeurs in Seattle. We used these numbers as a point of comparison because we know that one of the 
critiques of the platform economy is that the drivers are categorized as independent contractors and not employees. We 
find, calculated many different ways, that platform drivers’ net earnings are higher than these employee taxi drivers. 
Taxi drivers, as employees do have some benefits, like unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, that 
platform drivers do not. However, as far as we can tell, these taxi drivers do not have retirement plans or health insurance 
provided by their companies. Moreover, our analysis is pre-tax, so all of our figures on platform drivers do not take 
account of the ways in which independent contractors can deduct their expenses, and take advantage of other small 
business tax opportunities —which of course, employees cannot.  
For readers concerned with the relationship of earnings and tips, please see Chart 1.9 above. 
 
OES 
Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs Earnings 
Unfortunately, the 2019 earnings numbers for taxi drivers are no longer available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The 2019 OES survey, released in May 2020, combined Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs in a new category: “Passenger 
Vehicle Drivers, Except Bus Drivers, Transit and Intercity” that combines Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs with School Bus 
Drivers (despite the name). If we used the new 2019 category, the earnings of taxi drivers would be outweighed by those 
earnings of bus drivers. In Seattle, bus drivers number almost twice (6,200) that of taxi drivers and chauffeurs (3,160). 
Bus drivers had 2018 median hourly earnings of $21.81 compared to taxi drivers, who had a 2018 median hourly earnings 
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of $16.15. Using the 2019 OES category of “Passenger Vehicle Drivers” we believe, would incorrectly suggest a massive 
increase in taxi driver earnings. 
Since we actually want to compare the platform drivers against taxi drivers and chauffeurs, not school bus drivers, we 
adjusted the 2018 earnings numbers by the Employment Cost Index.  
In order to adjust for a year’s wage inflation, we apply adjustment factor of 4.1% in the second column.  This adjustment is 
the change in the Employment Cost Index for private employees in Seattle-Tacoma for the 12 months ending in 
September 2019 (2.4%) plus the national private sector difference in the ECI increase for transportation and moving 
occupations compared to all employees (1.7 percentage points). 
After this adjustment, the median taxi hourly earnings are $16.81 in 2019, and the median annual earnings are $34,957. 
Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs Population 
Chart 1.15 also shows that there are relatively few taxi and limousine drivers in Seattle, compared to the number of 
platform drivers. 
In our study, we found over 14,000 platform drivers in just one week, while the OES data shows about 3,000 taxi and 
limousine drivers—or about one-fifth the number of platform drivers. In Charts 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15, we show the relative 
population of employed taxi drivers in Seattle, as well as their relative hourly earnings compared to other service-economy 
jobs. 
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Chart 1.14: Seattle hourly earnings among benchmark jobs
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Critique of OES 
Hall and Krueger (2016) are suspicious of the OES data because OES is survey data sent from employers. Thus the data 
included in OES is related only to employees, not independent contractors. The category is also broad and does not 
pertain exclusively to taxi drivers. Rather, it includes chauffeurs, limo drivers, etc, whose hourly earnings are probably 
higher than taxi drivers.  
If anything, these OES numbers overestimate the hourly earnings of taxi drivers because limousine drivers are better paid 
(we believe).  
Hall/Krueger believe the hourly earnings comparison between platform drivers and taxi drivers is not accurate since 
employees "probably" do not bear the same expenses that Uber/Lyft drivers do: gas, maintenance, depreciation, health 
insurance, employer taxes. They do note that these expenses can be deducted from income taxes but do not include tax 
deductions in their analysis. They concede that this overestimates driver costs in their study. 
We believe that independent contractors, after subtracting their costs, could reasonably compare their pre-tax earnings 
with those of drivers who are employees. Taxes are particularly controversial in comparing employees and independent 
contractors, but we think starting with pre-tax income is a necessary first step. 
Despite these difficulties, therefore, we still think the OES is the most reasonable benchmark. If anything, the OES wage 
numbers are higher than the actual taxi driver earnings. For most policymakers, the relevant question is: are platform 
drivers, as independent contractors, paid more or less than taxi drivers who are employees? The answer, as we will see 
below, is ‘more’—for nearly all drivers. 
 
Taxi Driver Costs 
An inevitable question is whether taxi drivers’ earnings include their costs or not. Survey level data from OES, and QCEW 
provide data on wages only and with respect to employees. As such, we conclude that these data sources do not include 
costs. The data on self-employed taxi drivers, however, is less clear. The survey questions asked pertain only to earnings 
and do not ask respondents to account for expenses. Self-employed taxi drivers, however, do incur expenses, including 
the leasing of medallions.  
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The OES survey reports on the earnings of employees, not the self-employed.12 OES wages are gross pay before taxes. 
Tips are included.  It does not report on whether costs are included or not. As employees, we assume that these taxi 
drivers are reimbursed for their expenses.   
 
Seattle and the Nation 
For all occupations in Seattle, we performed a similar adjustment as for taxi drivers, in order to remain consistent.  The 
median annual earnings for all occupations in Seattle in 2019 was $52,945. The hourly median was $25.45. At the 
national level, we would not have used the same numbers from the Employment Cost Index, and decided to use the 
actual OES estimates for median earnings in 2019, which was $39,810. 
 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
The BLS offers another measurement of taxi and limousine services, the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW). The QCEW is based on employer administrative data, not employer survey data, which should make it more 
objective. Yet, it seems based on a very small sample that inflates the earnings data. 
For the fourth quarter of 2019, the QCEW estimated an average weekly wage in King County, where Seattle is located, at 
$2,109 or $52.73 per hour.13 For King County, the QCEW listed only 385 drivers in 26 establishments. These hourly 
earnings seem much higher and the employment much lower than in OES.  
We find these numbers, because of their small sample size and high hourly earnings (more than twice the median hourly 
earnings in Seattle, about the same as an industrial engineer or an optometrist), dubious. 
  
                                            
12 https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/oes_tec.htm 
13 NAICS 4853 Taxi and Limousine Service; 
https://data.bls.gov/cew/apps/Table_maker/v4/Table_maker.htm#type=1&year=2019&qtr=4&own=5&ind=4853&supp=0 
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Existing Literature 
We consider several studies that have set the pace for analysis of the driver app labor market: Hall and Krueger (2018), 
Parrott and Reich (2018), Mishel (2018), and Zoepf et al (2018). Each of these studies touch on several controversies in 
the field that warrant further consideration and comparison. We evaluate these studies in light of expense estimates, 
working hour estimates, and demographic data. Our comprehensive use of Seattle microdata leads us to different 
conclusions than these earlier studies. 
Each of the aforementioned studies takes a slightly different approach to estimating expenses.  
Local, National 
Hall and Krueger analyze their study at a national scale and draw out conclusions based on major metropolitan areas. 
This comes with analytical costs. Critics have pointed to Hall and Krueger’s insufficient attention to the particularities of 
place. Municipal governance is not universal. Each city has its own licensing regimes, costs, and spatial driving patterns. 
Without sufficient attention to these idiosyncrasies, Hall and Krueger are unable to account for the full weight of driver 
costs and expenses. 
Vehicles 
Further, Hall and Krueger concede that without knowledge of specific car models and other driving information that their 
model is at best a rough approximation.14 This should not be taken as a criticism of Hall and Krueger’s analysis. They 
simply lacked the data to make more granular estimations of costs. 
Parrott and Reich improve on the assumptions of Hall and Krueger by isolating the Toyota Camry as the most popular car 
utilized by New York City drivers.  Our study, by contrast, considers the range of car make and models used in Seattle. 
We consider cars of standard and expensive trim specifications. This allows us to take a close look at the variation of 
expenses incurred by Seattle drivers. Zoepf et al similarly base their expense modelling off the most popularly used cars 
by Uber drivers but again rely on national car statistics for their analysis.15 
                                            
14 Jonathan V. Hall and Alan B. Krueger, "An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber's Driver-Partners in the United States," ILR Review 71, no. 3 
(May 2018): 726. 
15 Stephen Zoepf, Stella Chen, Paa Adu, Pozo Gonzalo, “The Economics of Ride Hailing: Driver Revenue, Expenses, and Taxes,” Unpublished 
paper, MIT. While other parts of their study were heavily criticized, expense estimates were not challenged. 
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Expense Categories 
Parrott and Reich (2018) provide very careful and detailed of analysis in their study of New York drivers. Their study 
groups costs in certain categories: one-time (amortized over five years), recurring, and operating. One-time costs include 
examinations, licenses, and training required as part of New York City regulatory codes. Recurring costs include further 
licensing and renewals, vehicle registration, and inspection fees. Operating costs include gas, car payments, commercial 
insurance, and vehicle maintenance. These costs reflect the particular New York regulatory environment in which drivers 
work. Parrott and Reich acknowledge that the New York driving environment is particularly cost heavy and this drives up 
their expense estimates. 
Many of our assumptions reflect similar logic in estimating expenses but are tailored to the local environment in Seattle. 
Like Parrott and Reich we consider in detail the local conditions that shape a driver’s experiences.16 Our study takes into 
account driver costs that are unique to Seattle. We account for local gas prices, car values, driving patterns, and tax 
policies that might impact Seattle app drivers. We similarly estimate fuel economy based on city driving. Seattle drivers do 
not face the intense regulatory environment of New York.  
Furthermore, Parrott and Reich assume a full-time driver averages 35,000 additional miles over the course of a year. 
When calculating per mile values, the authors utilize this value as a denominator. In some ways, this approach is similar 
to considering the returns to the asset value of the cars as a part of driver costs.    
Where we differ is in our starting assumptions about drivers. According to the data set that we have, very few drivers are 
on the road in Seattle more than 40 hours per week. We treat costs as marginal expenses, except for the small 
percentage of full-time drivers. These differences are discussed in more detail in Section 5: Expenses. A recent study by 
AlphaBeta in Sydney, Australia similarly used an incremental approach to evaluate expenses.17  We acknowledge that the 
marginal cost approach does not take into account any return to drivers for the use of their car. 
                                            
16 James A. Parrott and Michael Reich, “An Earnings Standard for New York City’s App-Based Drivers: Economic and Policy Assessment,” New 
York: The new School, Center for New York City Affairs (July 2018). A Report for the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission. 
17 AlphaBeta, "Flexibility and fairness," news release, March 2019, accessed June 25, 2019, https://ubernewsroomapi.10upcdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Alphabeta-Report_Flexibility-and-fairness_-what-matters-to-workers-in-the-new-economy.pdf 
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Mishel (2019) follows Zoepf et al (2018) in his expense analysis. However, Mishel also develops a cost model that 
considers the tax implications of app driver’s expense and earnings.18 While we do not consider it here, we believe tax 
analysis is worth further study in a subsequent paper. 
Demographic Data: 
Parrot and Reich along with Hall and Krueger, and more recently AlphaBeta, pay careful attention to driver characteristics. 
With their survey level data, they are able to account for a demographic representation of drivers in their studies: 
education levels, familial status, etc. We do not have the ability to link our data set to those demographic variables. 
Demographic data may impact the policy implications and the sociological context in which drivers make decisions. It also 
impacts the expenses incurred by drivers. Parrott and Reich argue that many New York City drivers are young immigrants 
and thus face higher than average insurance fees. They further argue that most drivers are full-time and would otherwise 
work as taxi drivers. With this information, they argue that full time drivers are most likely to purchase another vehicle for 
their app driving. Accordingly, car payments and leases are included as major expenses in their study. Given the 
regulatory environment and driver demographic information, Parrott and Reich argue that flexibility claims about the 
nature of app driving work are exaggerated.19 
Our study does not utilize demographic data and thus we make no assumptions about the demographic makeup of a 
typical driver. This makes it difficult to fully engage with Hall and Krueger, Parrot and Reich, and Alphabeta’s claims 
regarding the value and costs of flexibility in the app driver labor market. We have accounted for alternative job options 
and wage potential. However, it would be difficult to say what alternative is indeed an appropriate job for drivers of 
different demographics. We can however compare taxi drivers with similar low-wage jobs in Seattle, which we do in Chart 
1.14 above. 
Working Hours 
In their 2018 study, Parrott and Reich use a four-part scheme to organize the distribution of working hours on a weekly 
basis. Drivers are grouped according to numbers of hours worked: 1-15, 16-34, 35-39, and over 50. Like the IRS, Parrott 
                                            
18 Lawrence Mishel, “Uber and the Labor Market: Uber Drivers’ Compensation, Wages, and the Scale of Uber and the Gig Economy,” Economic 
Policy Institute, 2018. 
19 James A. Parrott and Michael Reich, “An Earnings Standard for New York City’s App-Based Drivers: Economic and Policy Assessment,” New 
York: The new School, Center for New York City Affairs (July 2018). A Report for the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission. 
  
Section 1: Defining Driving in Seattle     58 
and Reich consider work times in excess of 30 hours as full-time work. Drivers who work less than 20 hours are 
considered part-time. In New York City, Parrott and Reich estimate that approximately 60 percent of drivers are full-time 
and 16 percent are slightly above part-time classification, with the remaining drivers classified as part-time.20 This is in 
stark contrast to the data we have found in Seattle where only a small number of drivers are full-time. We also posit a 
novel imputation of part-time and full-time status in our study. 
Without log-on and log-off time, Parrot and Reich calculate working hours based off trip starting and ending times: from 
the beginning of the first trip to the end of the last trip. They consider working hours only when a driver takes on a 
passenger ride. This, as they acknowledge, slightly underestimates working time as drivers often spend time on the app 
waiting for a ride to come up. Because their data is aggregated across platforms and they lack log-on and log-off, Parrott 
and Reich estimate working hours by summing the total trip durations and dividing this sum by the proportion of total 
working time that a driver has a passenger. This allows them to account for multi-platform drivers who might move 
between apps during their “shift.” Our measurement of hours aligns with this logic, but with access to more granular data 
we are able to offer a more fine-tuned picture of working time. 
Faulty Statistics 
Aggregated data, such as made available to other researchers in Seattle and in other previous studies, contains very 
important, yet not obvious limitations. 
Consider estimating “hourly earnings”  as the ratio of  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
 .  For an individual driver, we would simply divide earnings 
by hours. Naively, we might use the provided aggregated statistics for a similar calculation, and compute 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 .  
Many previous studies, drawing on the published aggregated statistics of Lyft and Uber have done so. 
While this division seems intuitively correct, it is nonetheless mathematically misleading. The number 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 .   is not 
equivalent to 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
�. In fact, 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒   can be shown to be always equal to or less than 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �, a 
well-known mathematical result called Jensen’s inequality. 
                                            
20 James A. Parrott and Michael Reich, “An Earnings Standard for New York City’s App-Based Drivers: Economic and Policy Assessment,” New 
York: The new School, Center for New York City Affairs (July 2018). A Report for the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission. 
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As an example consider Table 1.16, using numbers made up simply for illustrative purposes, the 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵
� is 
greater than  𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐵𝐵). Using A and B (which could be earnings, hours, or anything), we compute �𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵�. Here the 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵� is 
1.3, while the 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐵𝐵) is 0.7. To simply take a mean and divide it by another mean does not actually give the true number 
desired, even though the calculation looks very similar to the proper calculation. Only with the underlying data can the 
proper 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵
� be calculated. Any similarity between 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵
�  and 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐵𝐵) is coincidental. In this example, in Table 
A.2, the actual average is almost double the ‘average’ calculated by dividing means. 
Any ratio computed from means should be considered an estimation that is biased downward. 
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Table 1.16: Illustrative example of the distinction in the calculation of means 
Observation A B �𝑨𝑨
𝑩𝑩
� 
Alpha 2.0 20.0 0.1 
Bravo 4.0 4.0 1.0 
Charlie 6.0 9.0 0.7 
Delta 8.0 6.0 1.3 
Echo 10.0 3.0 3.3 
 Mean: 6.0 Mean: 8.4 Mean: 1.3 
 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �
𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵
� = 1.3 
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝐵𝐵) = 6.08.4 = 0.7 
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Earlier we discussed statistical problems in earlier studies. In Parrott and Reich, for instance, the researchers computed a 
ratio estimate with “weekly earnings” divided by “hours driven” in order to calculate what they think is ‘earnings per hour’. 
This estimate has a downward bias.  Furthermore, as can be seen in Chart 1.6, the distribution of hours driven is right 
skewed so using a mean to estimate hours driven leads to an even greater downward bias in the estimated earnings per 
hour.  
Parrott and Reich use imputed numbers of hours driving because of complications in determining company-specific 
working time when a driver uses more than one platform when using their aggregated data.  In our microdata we found a 
third of the drivers used multiple apps. Using imputed driver working time to estimate hourly earnings for each driver on a 
given platform would give an error in about a third of the drivers.   We take great care to deduplicate the microdata P1 
times and calculate the correct the P1 times.  Aggregating imputed driver working times across app platforms inflates P1 
times which further compounds the downward bias in the Parrott and Reich estimated earnings per hour. 
 
 
Anticipated Objections to Comparing Taxi Drivers and Platform Drivers 
The ride-sharing and taxi industries compete for some of the same passengers, so it might be believed that the rise of 
ride-sharing has decreased taxi earnings and employment, and therefore the benchmark for taxi driver earnings would be 
decreased because of Uber and Lyft drivers. We did not find evidence of this decrease.  
As seen in the Chart 1.17, we can see that after Uber’s entry into Seattle in 2011, the number of taxi drivers actually grew 
at compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.8%. Similarly median taxi hourly earnings also grew, at a CAGR of 6.2%. 
As shown in Table 1.18, we show the percentiles of taxi driver earnings for 2018, the last year for which there is reputable 
data. Taxi drivers had considerable variation in earnings, and many earned below the minimum wage. 
The taxi driver hourly earnings are far more volatile than other low-wage jobs, but that volatility occurred before Uber’s 
entry into the Seattle market. We suspect that the mix of taxi drivers and limousine drivers, as well as the increase in the 
supply of taxi and limousine drivers is behind the variation in these hourly earnings, but have no evidence to support that 
claim. We do not, however, see any relationship between the timing of Uber’s market entry and a change in the number of 
taxi drivers or their median earnings.  
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Chart 1.17: Taxi employment, median hourly earnings
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Table 1.18: Taxi driver hourly and annual earnings in Seattle
$nominal
2018
Number 3,160
10th $  12.08 
25th $  13.53 
Median $  16.15 
75th $  18.47 
90th $  21.79 
Annual Median $33,580 
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Limits of the Study 
As hopefully useful as these findings are, the study has limits that need to be highlighted: 
Place: These findings reflect the drivers in Seattle. Hours, hourly earnings, and platform mix might vary outside the city 
limits of Seattle.  
Time: These findings reflect a particular week in October of 2019. While we believe there was nothing particularly special 
about that week, further studies would be necessary to detect weekly, monthly, or annual patterns. 
Source: We received the data for the total population, not a random sampling under our control. 
Costs: We may not have considered additional hidden costs that drivers incur when driving. In our regression analyses to 
differentiate marginal costs from fixed costs, we used the majority of car models driven by Uber and Lyft drivers. Some 
uncommon car models might have different marginal costs.  
Categories: We divide drivers into four groups, the names of which may be slightly misleading since they are grouped by 
percentiles not hour cutoffs. We also define that percentile by P2+P3 time, not P1+P2+P3 time. Full-timers, for instance, 
are defined as the most committed 5% of drivers, not drivers above 40 hours a week. Yet once their P1 time is included, 
their median time is actually more than 40 hours per week, so these categories do roughly accord with common sense. 
Having the driver categories defined by percentile rather than hour cut-offs allows us to allow the hours to fluctuate across 
definitions. 
Decomposition of P1: We would have liked to have spent more time handling the subtleties of P1 across time of day, but 
because of COVID, we found ourselves constrained. We plan to explore this topic in a subsequent report. 
Taxes: We would like to have examined the tax implications for drivers, but decided that would be better explored, more 
fully, in a subsequent report. 
Driver Tenure: We did not have a variable on how long drivers had been using either app, so we could not test 
“experience” against hourly earnings.  
Bonuses: Our earnings data did not include “streak bonuses” or similar kinds of incentive earnings for drivers. For drivers 
that participated in these programs, their earnings would have been higher. 
Car Size: We examined only cars in the UberX and LyftDF, not UberXL, UberSelect, LyftXL, Lyft Lux, or similar programs. 
We also did not examine shared rides, like Lyft Shared or Uber Pool. 
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Airport: Seattle is unlike many other cities in that its major airport, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, is outside the city 
limits and therefore out the scope of this study. Unlike studies of New York City, where two of three major airports are in 
the city limits, our study would not account for the wait time of drivers at the airport. 
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Introduction 
In Section 2, we look at the P2 and P3 time of drivers excluding P1. In this section, when we refer to “hours” or “driving 
hours” we intend P2 + P3 time. 
If drivers did not have to wait for a ride, they would still need to drive to pick someone up (P2) and then drive that person 
somewhere else (P3). This Section can be thought of as a thought experiment if the apps were 100% efficient in 
connecting passengers to drivers with no wait time. If that were the case (which it is not), drivers would have median 
hourly earnings, as shown below in Table 2.2, of $36.31. That figure, $36.31, should be thought of as the median upper 
limit on earnings. 
In a world where drivers never waited for a ride, the median driver would earn $36.31 an hour. 
Hours 
Examination of the distribution of driving hours reveals the variety of driver behavior in Seattle. The mean driver drove 
about 9 hours in that week. The median driver only drove 7 hours, which implies that some drivers drove exceptionally 
longer hours than the median driver. Yet very few drivers drive what we would consider full-time, when excluding P1. 
Even with a conservative minimum, 26 hours, only 5 percent of drivers were full-time. Overall, only 0.3 percent of drivers 
drove 40 hours or more a week in P2 + P3. 
Earnings  
It is easy to imagine different stories for the relationship between hours driven and earnings, some of which have 
contradictory predictions. A full-time driver, for instance, could have more tactical knowledge to maximize earnings: 
deciding on the best fares to take, the choicest locations, or estimating the most profitable routes. On the other hand, the 
casual driver might cleverly only come on the app during peak surge demand, driving up their hourly rate.  
We expected that drivers’ hourly earnings rate would go up as drivers’ hours went up, reflecting the experience of a more 
committed driver. Our regression analysis, however, did not support this hypothesis. The hourly rate did not depend on 
the number of hours. The P2+P3 hours, of course, is not the same as driver tenure. We did not have access to the length 
of time a driver had been using the app. Further studies might reveal a connection between hours driven over a long 
period of time that more meaningfully predicts hourly earnings. 
Instead, as we see in Table 2.1, hourly earnings, when only accounting for P2+P3 time, were markedly stable across the 
majority of drivers, regardless of how long they drove in a week. Also, regardless of whether a driver drove only for Lyft, 
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only for Uber, or for a mix of the two, their hourly earnings were statistically equivalent (again, when only considering 
P2+P3 time). 
Using P2+P3 hours, the difference in average hourly pay between the most casual and the most full-time drivers is a little 
under two dollars an hour. Put another way, the median casual driver earns 95% of the full-time driver’s hourly earnings. 
Regardless of time spent, drivers still took home roughly the same hourly pay rate. 
The P2 + P3 hourly earnings had a median of $36.31 per hour. The middle of the distribution is relatively concentrated, 
with the 25th percentile earnings $32.85 and the 75th percentile earning $40.21 per hour. The extremes were a bit more 
extreme in this case, with the top 1 percent earning $66.12 and the bottom 1 percent earning $21.36. In Chart 2.2, we 
show a histogram of drivers’ hourly earnings. In Table 2.3, we show the percentiles of drivers’ hourly earnings by type. As 
is common in this data set, the casual drivers exhibit far greater variation than more committed drivers. 
Considering only P2+P3 time, only a vanishingly small number of drivers earned less than the minimum wage of $16.39 
an hour — 0.3 percent.  
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Table 2.1: Hours and earnings by driver type (P2 + P3)
Type Driver Percentage
Minimum 
Hours
Maximum 
Hours Mean Hours
Median 
Hours
Median 
Hourly Pay
Median Weekly 
Pay
Casual 25% 0.0 2.7 1.3 1.2 $35.53 $43.90 
Committed 
Casual 50% 2.7 14.0 7.4 6.9 $36.19 $254.28 
Part-Timer 20% 14.0 26.6 19.2 18.7 $36.63 $689.59 
Full-Timer 5% 26.7 58.1 32.3 31.0 $37.22 $1,162.88 
All 100% 0.0 58.1 9.5 6.9 $36.31 $254.04
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Chart 2.2: Hourly earnings of drivers (P2+P3)
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Type 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile
Casual $29.64 $35.53 $42.68 
Committed Casual $33.02 $36.19 $39.86 
Part-Timer $34.17 $36.63 $39.53 
Full-Timer $34.68 $37.22 $39.94 
All $32.85 $36.31 $40.21 
Table 2.3: Hourly earnings by driver type (P2 + P3)
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Platforms, Multi-Apping and Earnings  
We do find that drivers who multi-apped had P2+P3 earnings $0.77 per hour higher than single-app drivers. Again, while 
this was statistically meaningful, the model overall had an R2 of approximately zero (0.18%), suggesting that almost none 
of the difference in the hourly earnings between the drivers could be explained by whether they single-apped or multi-
apped, when looking only at the P2+P3 time. 
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Share of Passengers 
Two of the main questions, as well, for policymakers is how much time drivers spend conveying passengers (P3) versus 
driving to get the passengers (P2), and what kinds of drivers are moving people around the city. 
The P3:P2 ratio is the ratio of the amount of time driving a customer to driving to pick up a customer. In Seattle, as seen in 
Table 2.3, the median ratio of P3 to P2 time was four hours—or for every hour driven to pick someone up, drivers spent 4 
hours actually transporting passengers/fares. Another way of thinking about this time is in percent of time in P2 and P3. 
We see very little variation in the ratio of time spent picking up to driving passengers across driver types as seen in Table 
2.4.  Yet drivers, overall, vary in their P3:P2 ratios, as seen in the histogram in Chart 2.5. 
As policymakers consider who is actually driving passengers around Seattle, it is important to notice that most passenger 
hours (80%) are driven by Committed Casual and Part-Time drivers, as shown in Chart 2.6. Full-time drivers account for 
only 17% of passenger hours. Casual drivers, despite being 25% of the driver population, account for only 3% of 
passenger hours, as seen in Chart 2.6. 
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Table 2.4: Time drive to pick up passengers, to drive passengers by driver type (P2 + P3)
Type Median P3:P2 Ratio Median P2 Percentage
Median P3 
Percentage
Casual 3.6 22% 78%
Committed Casual 3.8 21% 79%
Part-Timer 3.9 20% 80%
Full-Timer 4.0 20% 80%
All 3.9 21% 79%
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Chart 2.5: Percentage of drivers’ P3:P2 ratios
%, hours
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f d
riv
er
s
Hours
  
Section 2: No Waiting (P2+P3)     76 
   
5%
17%
20%
41%
50%
39%
25%
Full-Time
Drivers
3%
Casual
Passenger-Hours
Part-Time
Committed Casual
100%
Chart 2.6: Driver Share of Passenger-Hours
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Introduction 
In this Section, when we refer to P1 time it is all the logged P1 time, except for P1 double counted across platforms. This 
deduplicated P1 time includes P1 time that preceded rides, but also P1 time that preceded rejections and logoffs. 
In this Section, P1 or P1 All, unless otherwise noted, refers to this most-expansive definition of P1.  
Hours 
The hours are longer once P1 is added, with 11.2 median weekly hours. Even with this expansive definition of P1, only 
5.4% of drivers exceeded 40 hours per week.  
The median driver spent 36% of his or her time in P1 All, but this median conceals vast differences. More committed 
drivers spend much less time (32%) in P1 All than more casual drivers (42%).  
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Table 3.1: Time percentage in P1 All
%
P1 Percentage
Casual 42%
Committed Casual 36%
Part-Timer 34%
Full-Time 32%
All 36%
Table 3.2: Time percentage in P1 All
%
P1 Percentage
25th Percentile 29%
Median 36%
75th Percentile 43%
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Earnings 
The gross median hourly earnings for drivers, when including expansive P1, was $23.20, as seen in Table 3.1 and Chart 
3.2. This number is earnings before costs. 
The earnings had considerable variation, unlike the hourly earnings when only considering P2+P3 time. The 25th 
percentile was $19.68 and the 75th percentile was $26.46. The median pay varies more as more P1 time is added, as 
seen in Table 3.3. While the time to pick up passengers and the time to drive passengers does not vary much across the 
categories of drivers, P1 time does, which drives considerable variation in hourly earnings, as seen in the histogram in 
Chart 3.4. Overall, 13% of drivers earn less per hour than the average taxi driver ($16.81) and 12% less than the 
minimum wage ($16.39).  
Such averages can be very misleading, however. Consider that 12% of drivers earn less than $16.39, but that is largely 
driven by the large number of casual drivers, 32% of whom earn less than the minimum wage, as seen in Chart 3.5. Only 
3% of the full-time drivers — just 20 drivers out of more than 14,000 — earn less than the minimum wage.  
As seen in Chart 3.6, while casual drivers make up 25% of the driver population, they are 54% of all drivers who earn less 
than minimum wage. While there are fewer part-time and full-time drivers, there are also very few of those drivers (4% 
and 1% respectively) earning less than the minimum wage.  
Drivers who multi-apped earned, on average, $2.01 more per hour. Regression analysis showed a weak, but extant, R2 of 
2%.  
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Table 3.3: Hours and earnings by driver type (P1 All + P2 +P3)
Type Driver Percentage
Median 
Hours
Median 
Hourly Pay
Median Weekly 
Pay
Casual 25% 2.2 $20.18 $43.90 
Committed 
Casual 50% 11.1 $23.15 $254.28 
Part-Timer 20% 28.9 $24.32 $689.59 
Full-Timer 5% 46.5 $25.32 $1,162.88 
All 100% 11.2 $23.20 $254.04
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Chart 3.4: Distribution of hourly earnings (P1 All + P2 + P3)
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Chart 3.5: Below minimum wage drivers by category (P1 All + P2 + P3)
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Chart 3.6: Share of Drivers Earning Below Minimum Wage by category (P1 All + P2 + P3)
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Introduction 
In this Section we only include P1 that preceded a ride. If a driver rejected a ride or logged off, we have excluded that P1 
time. We believe this is a reasonable estimate for P1, in that it considers time that lead to work as work, and time that did 
not lead to work not as work. 
In this Section, whenever we refer to P1, we are using that definition which we think is a reasonable middle ground 
between no P1 and all P1. 
Hours  
Once the app is on, the median driver spends about 29% of his or her time waiting for a ride, as seen in Table 4.1. Casual 
drivers, again, have had different experiences than the rest of the drivers, but the gap here is not as large as in Section 3. 
The elimination of P1 time leading to P0 or rejected rides, reduces the differences in between more and less committed 
drivers. 
P1 time is more variable than either P2 or P3 time. As seen in Table 4.2, drivers in the top 25% spend about 22% of their 
time waiting for a ride, while drivers in the bottom 25% spend at least 35% of their time waiting for a ride.  
As show in Table 4.3, multi-app drivers reduce their P1 time, allowing them to spend more time picking up passengers.   
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Table 4.1: Time percentage in P1 by driver type
%
P1 Percentage
Casual 27%
Committed Casual 29%
Part-Timer 30%
Full-Time 29%
All 28%
Table 4.2: Time percentage in P1 for all drivers
%
P1 Percentage
25th Percentile 22%
Median 28%
75th Percentile 35%
Casual Committed Casual Part-Time Full-Time All
Multi-app 22% 25% 27% 26% 26%
Single-app 25% 30% 32% 31% 30%
Table 4.3: P1 percentage by driver type and app-use
%
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Earnings  
For drivers who concentrated on just one platform (about 2/3 of all drivers) we find that regardless of the platform, they 
earned the same rate. Including P1 in the rate, we find that the medians simply shifted lower. The distribution of hourly 
earnings remained roughly the same. 
As seen on Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the top 10 percent earned at least $33 per hour. The 25th and 75th percentiles were, 
respectively, about $23 and $29. The bottom 10% of drivers earned slightly under $20 per hour. As in other sections of 
this study, casual drivers had a greater variation than the other categories of drivers.  
When P1 is included, 2.5 percent drivers earn less than $15 per hour, which is ten times the percentage than when just 
considering P2+P3, but still a very small fraction of drivers.  
As seen in Charts 4.6 only 3.8 percent of drivers make less than the current Seattle minimum wage of $16.39 per hour. 
Perhaps most tellingly, 96 percent of all drivers earned more than the median hourly earnings for Seattle taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs—$16.81. And as we look closer, we see that, again, casual drivers disproportionately made up those drivers 
earning less than the minimum wage. While casual drivers were only ¼ of all drivers, they made up ¾ of all drivers 
making less than the minimum wage. 
A perhaps intuitive, but important, finding is that the lower the percentage of time spent in P1, the higher the hourly rate.  
One could easily imagine a strategy where drivers waited longer for possibly better paying rides. The data, however, 
contradicts this hypothesis. For every one percent point increase in P1 time, a driver’s hourly rate of pay falls about $0.31. 
So, a 10 percentage point increase in P1 time implies a $3.10 drop in hourly earnings rate. Waiting for a ride does not 
lead to higher hourly earnings. 
About 30% of the differences in drivers’ hourly earnings comes from the variation in the percentage of time in P1, which is 
the strongest effect we found in the data. 
Drivers who mix platforms tend to have higher hourly earnings than drivers who do not mix platforms, but there is 
considerable distribution within single-appers and multi-appers, as seen in Table 4.4 and Chart 4.7. In Table 4.5 and 
Chart 4.6, we can see the different earnings distributions for the different types of drivers. Full-time drivers have less 
variation in their earnings than casual drivers.  
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10th
Percentile 25th 50th 75
th 90th
Percentile
Single-App $18.79 $21.78 $24.99 $28.58 $33.06 
Multi-App $22.30 $24.62 $27.24 $30.06 $33.12 
Total $19.67 $22.69 $25.82 $29.19 $33.08 
Table 4.4: Hourly earnings percentiles by app-use (P1+P2+P3)
$
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10th
Percentile 25th 50th 75
th 90th
Percentile
Casual $15.90 $20.77 $25.90 $32.25 $39.53 
Committed 
Casual $20.27 $22.80 $25.83 $28.93 $32.27 
Part-Timer $21.40 $23.32 $25.64 $28.06 $30.57 
Full-Time $22.21 $24.34 $26.30 $28.58 $30.61 
All $19.67 $22.69 $25.82 $29.19 $33.08
Table 4.5: Hourly earnings percentiles by driver type (P1+P2+P3)
$
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Chart 4.6: Below minimum wage drivers by category (P1 + P2 + P3)
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Chart 4.7: Share of Drivers Earning Below Minimum Wage by category (P1 + P2 + P3)
%
20%
50%
20%
25%
74%
3%
100%
Share of Drivers Share of Below 
Minimum Wage Drivers
100 100
5% 3%
Casual
Committed Casual
Part-time
Full-time
  
Section 4: Waiting For A Ride (P1 Preceding Ride+P2+P3)     93 
JE  
Chart 4.8: Distribution of hourly earnings (P1 + P2 + P3)
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Chart 4.9: Hourly earnings (75th percentile, median, 25th percentile) by driver type (P1+P2+P3)
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Chart 4.10: Driver percentage of hourly earnings by platform usage (P1+P2+P3)
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Chart 4.11: Driver percentage of hourly earnings by platform usage, driver type (P1+P2+P3)
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Introduction 
Drivers incur costs while driving on Lyft and Uber. For every additional dollar earned, there is some additional cost. We 
include only additional costs that the drivers otherwise would not have incurred. Costs that a car owner would have 
regardless of driving on Lyft or Uber are not included (like finance charges, registration fees, personal insurance, etc.) The 
variable costs we consider important are depreciation, maintenance, and fuel. Since both platforms provide insurance 
while the app is on, there are no additional insurance costs. 
A reader might object that some drivers might purchase or lease an additional or more expensive car because they intend 
to drive on Uber or Lyft. We imagine that this might be the case for some full-time drivers (who are 5% of all drivers), but it 
is hard to believe that would be the case for the rest of the drivers. For those full-time drivers, a subsequent study would 
be needed to address the incremental cost of the car they would have otherwise purchased and the one that they bought 
to drive on Uber or Lyft.  
Similarly, a reader might object that we should include other forms of benefits, such as health insurance. Again, this kind 
of insurance is not marginal and should not be considered part of the additional costs. Moreover, it is not clear that most 
job alternatives available to platform drivers offer such benefits. 
We have calculated the costs on a per mile basis, in keeping with established methods of the IRS and AAA. 
We estimate that drivers have, on average, marginal costs of $0.19 per mile. Because in this study we calculate only pre-
tax earnings, it should be noted that the difference between the IRS mileage deduction rate ($0.58) and the actual per 
mile cost ($0.19) represents a significant tax deduction opportunity for drivers. 
Finally, as noted in the general section on marginal costs and asset rental, our marginal cost approach does not account 
for any return to capital for drivers who provide the service of their car. This issue requires more research and the 
attention of policymakers who seek to regulate the terms and conditions under which platform drivers work.  
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Car Types 
Drivers tend to use similar makes of cars across driver engagement. We see a smaller range of models for full-time 
drivers, but even among the casual drivers, most are using the same makes of cars.  
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Make of drivers’ cars by driver type
%
Top Car U.S. Top Car Seattle Top Car Platform Drivers
1
2
3
Ford F-150
Chevrolet Silverado
Ram 1500
Ford F-150
Honda CR-V
Subaru Outback
Toyota Prius
Toyota Camry
Toyota Corolla
Table 5.1:
  
Section 5: Expenses     102 
Mileage 
Understandably, drivers who drove longer hours, drove longer distances.  
Usually miles are discussed in annual terms, so we multiplied the weekly numbers by 52 to get annual numbers, as 
shown in Chart 5.2. This annual number is, almost certainly, an overestimate since it assumes someone drives every 
week of the year. Nonetheless, it will help us understand the relative scale of the driving compared to what is usually 
considered the average American’s annual mileage—15,000 miles per year (though the U.S. Department of 
Transportation puts it at 13,476 miles per year). 
Additionally, we found it useful to think about earnings per mile, especially when considering tax deductions. The median 
driver earned $1.83 per mile, which varied from $1.62 at the 25th percentile to $2.05 at the 75th percentile. Those numbers 
were stable across driver types. 
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Chart 5.2: Overestimated annualized median mileage by driver type
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Depreciation 
Depreciation is the decrease in value of an asset over time. For cars that is both the wear and tear on the car (as reflected 
in mileage) as well as simply becoming older (as reflected in its model year). For each car in the sample, we have the 
make and model, but do not have the initial mileage. 
The typical ways of calculating depreciation are either the IRS method, which is used for tax purposes, or the market 
(real-world) value of the car.   
For taxes, we would use government numbers (which are actually supplied to the IRS by a third-party consultancy). For 
depreciation, we use data from a trusted third-party source and calculate the change in value ourselves. We attempted to 
purchase data from Kelley Blue Book (KBB), which is the most well-known third party. However, KBB doesn’t sell its data 
to researchers. We located another provider of car values: Price Digests. 
Price Digests is a nationally-recognized data tool that aggregates retail values for cars. Washington state, for instance, 
uses Price Digests data to compute fair market value for cars for its tax purposes.21 If these data are good enough for 
Washington to use for taxation, we felt like they were good enough for us to use to calculate depreciation in Seattle. 
We obtained a customized dataset from Price Digests that captures prices for the most used vehicles, by make and 
model, at the beginning and at the end of 2019. With these data, we know how prices for different makes, models, and 
mileages of cars changed over the course of a year. With these data, we can estimate how mileage and model year 
independently affect the change in a car’s value. Most other depreciation models lump together the depreciation due to 
aging and the depreciation due to mileage. Even when they report depreciation per mile, they are adding together the 
depreciation due to aging and the depreciation due to mileage and then dividing by mileage.  
Since we are interested in understanding the costs that drivers face, we are not interested in depreciation due to aging. 
That depreciation would happen whether or not the driver drove for Lyft or Uber. We want to know the depreciation for the 
additional miles. 
 
                                            
21 https://www.dol.wa.gov/vehicleregistration/usetax.html 
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IRS Depreciation Estimates 
The IRS outsources its depreciation modelling to a firm called Motus. Motus estimates that depreciation accounts for 
approximately 37% of a car’s “cost to own.” Other factors of “cost to own” include fuel costs, insurance, lease payments, 
registration, maintenance which has increased markedly with the computerization of vehicles and general depreciation. 
General depreciation is the simple change in value of a car—the difference between a car’s initial cost and the price it 
would receive on the market at a given point in time. General deprecation, thus, is reflective of a range of factors: demand 
for particular cars, appearance, mileage, and model among other factors. These factors are often location-specific. It is 
difficult to determine which factor—mileage or model, for example—drives depreciation rates in these estimates.  
When the IRS/Motus considers general depreciation, its model takes a national approach in estimating deprecation for a 
“typical” car, which doesn’t reflect the cars driven on platforms. In the United States, the top three best-selling vehicles, 
according to Edmunds, are the Ford F-150, Chevrolet Silverado, and the Ram 1500. In Seattle in 2019, the top three were 
Ford F-150, Honda CR-V, and Subaru Outback.22 For Seattle platform drivers, the top three cars are the Toyota Prius, the 
Toyota Camry, and the Toyota Corolla. Toyota, Hyundai, Honda, and Nissan account for 72% of all cars on the platforms 
in Seattle. The percentage of these makes increases with drivers’ weekly hours. In Seattle, Ford (4.8%), Chevrolet (4%), 
and Ram (0.01%) are not represented among platform drivers as in the typical U.S. fleet.  
Calculating depreciation per mile assumes that a “typical” car gains 15,000 miles per year. 
Ultimately, the IRS/Motus concludes for 2018 that depreciation per mile is $0.25 for a 2018 or 2017 car, $0.24 for a 2016 
or 2015 car, and $0.22 for a 2014 car. 
The IRS tax deduction, $0.58 per mile, is much more than even the IRS estimates for depreciation, and again, these 
depreciation averages are for the US fleet, which does not resemble the platform fleet.  
 
AAA Depreciation Estimates 
AAA, on the other hand, provides slightly more granular estimates. AAA groups cars in five general categories: small 
sedan, medium sedan, large sedan, small SUV, and large SUV. For small sedans, for example, AAA estimates that 
depreciation costs in 2018 totaled $2,268. Thus, depreciation per mile for a small sedan is estimated at $0.15. 
                                            
22 https://www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/article/These-were-the-most-popular-new-and-used-vehicles-14916850.php#item-85307-tbla-13 
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Cornell Depreciation Estimates 
With these two general models we can already see that depreciation calculations vary markedly. Our depreciation 
calculations are based on data unique to Uber and Lyft in Seattle. It considers the nature of the fleet used on both 
platforms in the Seattle area, overwhelmingly small, eco-friendly sedans, on average, of the 2015 model year.  
Fortunately for our calculations (since we do not have the numbers) initial mileage appears to have no statistical effect on 
depreciation. 
The AAA and IRS models take an average approach, simply dividing annual depreciation by average miles driven. This 
approach does not differentiate the marginal depreciation of additional miles. 
Our modelling accounts for the differential rate the mileage or model of a car might have on depreciation levels.  
We used the cars models that account for the majority of the Seattle Uber and Lyft fleet (Toyota Prius, Toyota Camry, 
Toyota Corolla, Nissan Altima, Toyota Prius V, Hyundai Elantra, Toyota Camry Hybrid, Honda Civic, Hyundai Sonata, 
Nissan Sentra). While our model is correct for the majority of cars driven, it might over- or under-estimate for the less 
common models of car. 
Using regression analysis, as shown in Table 5.3 below, we differentiated between the depreciation due to additional 
miles and the depreciation due to car aging. We replicated the analysis with both the least expensive and most expensive 
trims for each model. The depreciation per additional mile averaged to about $0.02 per mile. We can see that 
depreciation, even for a car sitting idle, is still quite high. By taking the ratio of the year and the additional mileage, we can 
calculate that every year, a car loses the equivalent in value to 11,481 miles without driving a single mile. In Table 5.4, we 
compare the annual depreciation due to aging and the annual depreciation due to driving, by different driver types. On a 
weekly basis, these numbers are not particularly high.  
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Additional Miles Additional Miles + 
Initial Miles
Additional Miles + 
Initial Miles + Model 
Year
Additional Miles -.019*** -.019*** -.019***
Initial Miles 0.001 0.001
Model Year -218.139***
Constant -1705.411*** -1747.184*** 437,901.746***
R2 0.053 0.053 0.168
Table 5.3: Effect of additional miles, initial mileage, and car year on car value in one year
$
Depreciation = (-$0.019)*Mileage + (-$218.139)*Model Year of Car + Constant
Every mile 
costs about 
two cents.
Every year 
costs about 
$218.
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Casual Committed Casual Part-Timer Full-Timer All
Overestimated 
mileage 1,144 7,072 19,552 32,136 7,072 
Mileage 
Depreciation $  21.74 $134.37 $371.49 $610.58 $134.37 
Aging 
Depreciation $218.14 $218.14 $218.14 $218.14 $218.14 
Table 5.4: Overestimated annualized mileage, annual mileage depreciation, and annual aging depreciation
miles, $
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Maintenance Estimates 
For general maintenance costs, AAA includes retail parts and labor for routine maintenance as noted by the vehicle 
manufacturer, comprehensive extended warranty, and “wear and tear” that requires service over five years of operation. 
In addition, AAA includes one set of replacement tires similar to those included in a car’s original purchase as part of their 
maintenance estimates. 
AAA methodology is standardized to assume a new personal car, owned for five years with 75,000 miles of ownership. 
These are national estimates that reflect a broad national fleet. 
We used the AAA estimates for maintenance, but not fuel. 
The maintenance per mile varied little, between $0.08 at the 25th percentile to $0.09 at the 75th percentile, with a median 
$0.08. 
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Value Calculation
• Median $0.08 per mile
• 25th percentile: $0.08
• 75th percentile: $0.09
• Uses actual Seattle gas prices, $3.255, in October 
to calculate fuel costs. 
• Uses EPA ratings for city driving for actual car 
models (unlike IRS and AAA which assume a 
large fraction of highway driving)
• Uses AAA categorical estimates for maintenance 
cost per mile.
Fuel
Maintenance
• Median: $0.089 per mile
• 25th percentile: $0.043 
• 75th percentile: $0.108 
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Fuel 
Over the course of a year, AAA calculates an average of national gas prices, both diesel and regular unleaded, on a daily 
basis. In their depreciation calculations, AAA estimates a 12-month average for fuel costs. In 2019, AAA estimated fuel 
costs at $2.679 per gallon. Fuel economy rates, in the AAA estimates, are based on Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) ratings that estimate 55 percent city and 45 percent highway driving. 
In our estimates, we used the actual Seattle-area fuel prices from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We used the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics numbers for October 2019, $3.255, which was higher than the U.S. average of $2.741.  
Our fuel price, then, was higher than the AAA fuel price. 
We also used the actual EPA mileage numbers for city driving (which are lower than highway numbers) for every make 
and model to calculate actual fuel usage, rather than an approximation. The fuel cost varied between $0.043 for the 25th 
percentile to $0.108 per mile for the 75th percentile. Median fuel cost per mile was $0.089. 
 
 
Driver Costs 
Marginal  
We estimate that the median driver has $0.19 per mile in total costs, by combining fuel cost, maintenance, and mileage 
depreciation. The 25th and 75th percentiles are $0.14 and $0.22 per mile, respectively. The official IRS mileage deduction, 
again, is $0.58 per mile. So real costs would need to almost triple to exceed the tax deduction.  
For every ten dollars a driver grossed, they had, on average, one dollar in expenses. The percentage of costs per dollar of 
earnings, on average, was about 10%, but varied from 8% at the 25th percentile up to 12% at the 75th percentile. 
In Chart 5.5, we show a histogram of the distribution of those costs as a percentage of earnings. 
Fixed 
For full-time drivers, fixed costs, like the cost of the car should be incorporated. 
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While more complicated, specific calculations can be made for each specific car (financing, resale recoup, etc), a more 
accessible yardstick would be the highest possible cost for an actual full-time car.23 By taking the highest possible cost, 
we know that drivers would have, almost certainly, lower costs. So the hourly earnings number we calculate will be the 
lower bound on what a full-time driver could earn. Drivers in Seattle can rent cars from Hertz and Avis with a base rate of 
$214 per week, excluding taxes and fees.24  
Auto insurance is included in such a rental.25 We have also included additional personal insurance. Such insurance costs 
vary widely, but in downtown Seattle an average seems to be $77 per month or $19.25 a week, which is considerably 
cheaper than buying insurance through the rental car company.26 We have used this $19.25 as the cost of insurance for a 
week in Seattle. 
Every car rental comes with fees. We have estimated $50 in fees. 
In Seattle combined sales tax (city, county, state) is 10.1%. 
The highest possible cost would be a driver renting a car ($290.66) and getting private personal insurance ($19.25) for 
$309.91 per week. That ~$310 would include car registration, insurance, depreciation, and maintenance all included. 
If drivers’ cars are more expensive than that price, they are spending more than they need to spend. If their cars are less 
expensive, which they most likely are, then they are minimizing their costs. So that rental car is the maximum cost of the 
minimum car needed for platform driving. 
For full-time drivers, then, we should include a fixed cost of $309.91, but remove the marginal costs of depreciation and 
maintenance, which would be included in the rental price. We would still include fuel.  
Such a model increases the median cost for full-time drivers from $116 a week to $362 a week. Such costs are perhaps 
why there are fewer full-time drivers than less committed drivers. We also think that at that cost for a month of rental, 
many full-time drivers would find a car payment less expensive. Nonetheless, we have estimated this cost as the high end 
of possible full-time drivers. On a per mile basis, the fixed cost model has a median of $0.58 per mile. 
                                            
23 Here we mean, in more economic terms, the maximum cost of the minimum car. 
24 https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/misc/index.jsp?targetPage=uber_landing_page.jsp&LinkType=HZLK; https://bonjour.uber.com/marketplace/ 
25 https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/misc/index.jsp?targetPage=uber_landing_page.jsp 
26 https://quotewizard.com/auto-insurance/seattle-washington 
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Chart 5.5: Distribution of cost as percentage of earnings
%
Most drivers 
grossed $10 
for every $1 in 
costs
$0.22 
$0.19
$0.14
Total Per Mile Cost
Median total per mile cost
$
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6: Net Earnings 
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Introduction 
In this section we examine how gross earnings (the amount made before taxes and expenses) is changed by including 
marginal taxes and expenses.  
The pre-tax net earnings calculations do not account for taxes. We plan to release a follow-up report on the tax 
implications of worker classification. As platform drivers are independent contractors, all of their costs are deductible. 
Moreover, because the IRS mileage deduction is so much higher ($0.58) than the actual per mile costs ($0.19), the tax 
consequences will be significant. In a future report, we will examine the tax implications for drivers. The Pre-Tax Net 
Earnings should not be understood as the final measure of driver earnings, but as the lowest possible value.  
 
Pre-Tax Net Earnings 
After calculating the costs per mile, we subtract those costs from the earnings. As seen in Table 6.1, the median driver 
netted $23.25 per hour. For comparison, note that using the (inflated) AAA numbers, the median driver still nets $22.24 
per hour. As seen in Chart 6.6, the distribution of net hourly earnings looks similar to the earlier distributions, only with a 
lower median.  
Comparing the net earnings to key thresholds, 5% of drivers make less than $15 per hour, 8% make less than the Seattle 
minimum wage ($16.39), and 9% make less than the median taxi driver earnings ($16.81). Even after expenses, 9 in 10 
drivers made more than the average taxi driver as illustrated in Table 6.1. About 80% of drivers earn more than the best 
paid 25% of taxi drivers. 
In Table 6.3, we can see the way in which P1 affects the overall earnings through the report. 
Incorporating fixed costs for full-time drivers, of course, lowers their hourly earnings. As discussed earlier, this fixed cost 
model is not the actual costs for drivers (as in the marginal model) but the maximum possible fixed cost. Actual drivers 
would have lower costs. Nonetheless, it is a useful estimate for the lower-bound of full-time driver earnings, if you want to 
consider fixed costs. In Table 6.2 and Chart 6.4, we see that the median hourly earnings, calculated in this way, are 
$18.06 per hour.  
Examining the relative proportions of drivers earning less than the minimum wage, we see the same pattern as earlier. A 
large fraction of casual drivers earns less than the minimum wage (18%) but relatively few other drivers do. Incorporating 
the fixed cost model, creates a maximum of 26% of full-time drivers earning less than the minimum wage (after 
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expenses). The earnings experience of full-time drivers is quite different, if they incorporate fixed costs. This different in 
net rate might explain why there are so many more committed casual and part-time drivers than full-time drivers. Yet, 
even for this estimate of earnings, we still see 38% of full-time drivers making more than the 75th percentile of taxi drivers. 
Full-time platform drivers, even using the maximal costs, earn slightly more than taxi drivers. 
In Charts 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9, we can see the distribution of earnings. As drivers are more engaged with the platforms, the 
variation in their net hourly earnings lessens, which probably accounts for the concentration of the multi-app drivers’ 
earnings (since multi-app use increases alongside driver commitment.) 
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Part-TimeCommitted 
Casual
Casual Part-Time Committed 
Casual
AllFull-Time Casual Full-Time All
$25.90 $25.83 $25.64 $26.30 $25.82
$23.23 $23.25$23.27 $23.08 $23.70
Chart 6.1: Gross hourly earnings and net hourly earnings (75th percentile, median, 25th percentile) by 
driver type 
$
Gross hourly earnings Net hourly earnings
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Table 6.2: Net hourly earnings by driver type (P1+P2+P3)
Type 25th
Percentile
Median 75th
Percentile
More than 
minimum 
wage
More than 
mean taxi 
driver
More than
75th
percentile 
taxi driver
Casual $18.16 $23.23 $29.56 82% 81% 70%
Committed 
Casual $20.18 $23.27 $26.35 94% 93% 82%
Part-Time $20.76 $23.08 $25.52 97% 96% 87%
Full-Time
(Marginal 
Costs)
$21.66 $23.70 $25.92 96% 96% 92%
Full-Time 
(Fixed 
Costs)*
$16.24 $18.06 $20.43 73% 69% 38%
All $20.11 $23.25 $26.58 92% 91% 80%
* The fixed cost model incorporates the highest possible costs. Actual driver costs are 
probably lower. This model is not included in the All calculations.
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Table 6.3: Comparison of hours, hourly earnings by measurement
hours, $
Type Driver 
Percentage
Median 
Driving 
Hours 
(P2+P3)
Median 
Driving 
Hours (P1 
All + P2 + 
P3)
Median 
Driving 
Hours 
(P1+P2+P3
)
Median 
Hourly 
Earnings 
(P2+P3)
Median 
Hourly 
Earnings 
(P1+P2+P3
)
Median 
Hourly Net 
Earnings 
(P1 All + 
P2 + P3
Median 
Hourly Net 
Earnings 
(P1+P2+P3
)
Casual 25% 1.2 2.2 1.7 $35.53 $25.90 $17.95 $23.23 
Committed 
Casual
50% 6.9 11.1 9.9 $36.19 $25.83 $20.76 $23.27 
Part-Time 20% 18.7 28.9 27.1 $36.63 $25.64 $21.80 $23.08 
Full-Time 5% 31.0 46.5 44.2 $37.22 $26.30 $22.85 $23.70 
All 100% 6.9 11.2 9.9 $36.31 $25.82 $20.83 $23.25 
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$18.06
$26.30
Full-Time Full-Time 
(Marginal)
Full-Time 
(Fixed)
$23.70
Chart 6.4: Full-time gross hourly earnings and net 
hourly earnings 
$
Gross hourly 
earnings
Net hourly 
earnings
The fixed cost model is almost 
certainly more expensive than full-time 
drivers’ actual costs.
For the full-time cost, we used the 
most expensive full-time option: a 
weekly rental.
The weekly rental is more expensive 
than owning a car, but includes all fixed 
costs, except personal insurance, 
which we calculated separately (even 
though it is not required for platform 
driving).
$18.06 should be considered the lower 
bound for median full-time hourly 
earnings.
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Chart 6.5: Below minimum wage drivers by category (P1 + P2 + P3, net rate)
%
82%
94%
97%
96%
74%
92%
18%
26%
Full-time 4%
3%
Casual
Committed Casual 6%
Part-time
All
100%
Full-time (fixed cost model)*
8%
Above minimum wage
Below minimum wage
* The fixed cost model incorporates the highest possible costs. Actual driver costs are 
probably lower. This model is not included in the All calculations.
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Chart 6.6: Share of Drivers Earning Below Minimum Wage by category (P1 + P2 + P3, net rate)
%
20%
7%
50%
35%
25%
55%
99
5%
Share of Drivers
2%
100%
Share of Below 
Minimum Wage Drivers
100
Full-time
Casual
Committed Casual
Part-time
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Chart 6.7: Distribution of net hourly earnings (P1 + P2 + P3, net rate)
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Chart 6.8: Net hourly earnings distribution by type 
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Chart 6.9: Distribution of net hourly earnings by app-use 
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7: Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study, we have examined hours and earnings for platform drivers in Seattle for one week. These findings suggest 
the following: 
• Platform driving is primarily a side-gig. Very few drivers approach anything like a full-time work week. 
• Platform drivers’ hourly earnings net of marginal costs are higher than the minimum wage and comparable kinds of 
work, like taxi driving and chauffeuring. These earnings do not, however, include any returns to drivers for providing 
the use of their cars. 
• Multi-apping increases drivers’ earnings, but most drivers do not multi-app. 
Future studies could expand the time period and the geographic scope, as well as integrate data that would allow 
examination of the impact of demographic factors—like race, gender, and national origin—on drivers’ hours and earnings. 
They could also examine, in more detail, the more granular patterns of P1, P2, and P3. Finally, they could consider the 
most appropriate way to account for drivers' provision of their cars’ services.  
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Glossary 
Central tendency—the number that is the expected value of a variable. There exist multiple ways to define and measure 
this central tendency, most commonly mean and median. Conventional this is what people suggest when they say 
“average.” 
Dispersion—if the central tendency is the expect value of a variable, then the dispersion is how far values are from that 
central tendency. Multiple measures of dispersion exist, but the most common is standard deviation. 
Mean—A measure of central tendency which is the arithmetic average of the values.  For skewed distributions, the mean 
is not necessarily the same as the median.  
Median—A measure of central tendency, to find the median, arrange the observations in order from smallest to largest 
value. If there is an odd number of observations, the median is the middle value. If there is an even number of 
observations, the median is the average of the two middle values.  
Range—A measure of dispersion (how spread out a data set is) which is the difference between the lowest and highest 
values of a data set.  
Standard Deviation and Variance—A measure of dispersion which is calculated as the average squared deviation of 
each number from the mean of a data set. A measure of dispersion which is the square root of the variance.   
Percentile —A measure indicating the value below which a given percentage of observations in a group of observations 
falls. For example, the 95th percentile is the value below which 95% of the observations may be found.  The median is the 
50% percentile.  
Quantile—Point in a distribution that relate to the rank order of values in that distribution, we find any quantile by sorting 
the sample.  Percentiles are descriptions of quantiles relative to 100. 
Regression Analysis—A statistical method that allows one to examine the relationship between two or more variables of 
interest. While there are many types of regression analysis, at their core they all examine the influence of one or more 
independent variables on a dependent variable.  Traditional regression analysis models a relationship between the mean 
of a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Quantile regression analysis models a relationship 
between particular quantiles of a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. 
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R2 —The proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable(s) in a 
regression analysis. 
Regression Coefficient—An estimate of the slope of a straight line that is assumed be the relationship between the 
dependent variable and at least one independent variable.  A regression coefficient equal (or nearly) to zero indicates no 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. For indicator (dummy) independent variables, this can 
show up as a parallel shift in the estimated line or even a change in the slope of the line through an interaction with 
another independent variable. 
P-value—A statistical measure that indicates how incompatible the data are with a specified statistical model. In the case 
of “null hypothesis” testing, a lower p-value indicates the belief that there is no difference between two tested groups. The 
lower the p-value, the less compatible the data are with the null hypothesis. P-values do not measure the probability that 
the studied hypothesis is true, or the probability that the data were produced by random chance alone. Scientific 
conclusions and business or policy decisions should not be based only on whether a p-value passes a specific threshold. 
A p-value, does not measure the size of an effect or the importance of a result. 
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Fraudulent Data 
Given that we did not collect the data ourselves, we used standard techniques to detect any irregularities in the data. The 
results strongly suggest that the data are not fabricated. 
To assess the fidelity of the time-stamped data supplied by Lyft and Uber we applied methods that are routinely used in 
forensic accounting. The Benford’s Law technique, also known as the law of the leading digit, is widely applied to detect 
anomalous patterns in a variety of data settings. The law suggests that the leading digit of certain types of data entries 
appear with a certain relative frequency: 1 (30%), 2 (17.6%), 3(9.7%), 4 (7.9%), etc.  
The plots below give the 1st and 2nd digit frequencies for the sum of P1, P2, P3 times measured in second from the data 
supplied by Lyft and Uber. 
The bars give the relative frequencies in the driver data and the solid line give the expected Benford’s Law frequencies. 
The vertical bars give the 95% confidence intervals. 
In all cases the plots suggest a good agreement with Benford’s law; therefore we do not believe the data to be fraudulent. 
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Replication Study: Lyft and Uber Hours and Earnings (P2, P3) 
An important part of this study is the ability to examine P1 time across platforms. At the same time, of course, we 
examined the P2 and P3 time. To confirm that we were calculating P2 and P3 time correctly, we performed similar 
calculations on the P2 and P3 times used internally by the companies for billing purposes. 
Since the two data sets come from different reporting systems at the companies, we expected minor, insubstantial 
discrepancies, which is what we found.  
This replication of the P2 and P3 time is important because neither company knows how their drivers’ P1 (or P2 or P3) 
times intersect. The replication also provides reassurance that the P1 time is correct as well. 
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Earnings Comparisons 
The 2019 Occupational Employment Statistics survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics recategorized taxi drivers. We 
had a choice to use the 2019 numbers or the 2018 numbers and adjust them for inflation. We chose to use the 2018 
numbers because, as noted above, the weight of that new category skewed the comparison. For emphasis, we repeat the 
text from earlier in the next three paragraphs.  
To put these earnings in context, a reasonable starting point would be comparing the earnings of platform drivers and taxi 
drivers (and perhaps chauffeurs). Unfortunately the 2019 earnings numbers for taxi drivers are no longer available from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The 2019 OES survey, released in May, combined Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs in a new category: “Passenger Vehicle 
Drivers, Except Bus Drivers, Transit and Intercity” that combines Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs with School Bus Drivers 
(despite the name). Since we actually want to compare the platform drivers against taxi drivers and chauffeurs, not school 
bus drivers, we adjusted the 2018 earnings numbers by the Employment Cost Index. Including the bus drivers, who 
number almost twice (6,200) as many as taxi drivers and chauffeurs (3,160), with a 2018 median hourly earnings of 
$21.81, would incorrectly weight the earnings for taxi drivers, who had 2018 median hourly earnings of $16.15. 
The left column of the Table shows the published data for 2018. In order to adjust for a year’s wage inflation, we apply 
adjustment factor of 4.1% in the second column.  This adjustment is the change in the Employment Cost index for private 
employees in Seattle-Tacoma for the 12 months ending in September 2019 (2.4%) plus the national private sector 
difference in the ECI increase for transportation and moving occupations compared to all employees (1.7 percentage 
points). 
Because we were already using the 2018 numbers, we decided to continue that analysis at the city and national level, 
adjusting the earnings in the same way. For the other Seattle numbers, this adjustment is completely sound, but for the 
national level, 4.1% would be not correct, since that 4.1% comes from local conditions. Instead, for that national all 
occupations median earnings we used the actual 2019 data. 
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Summary table for comparison with other studies 
Earnings Type Statistic This Study 
 
Weekly earnings (including tips) 
mean  $350.33  
median  $254.04  
10th percentile  $35.10  
 
Hourly earnings without P1 time (i.e., assuming no 
waiting time ever) (Section 2) 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷  
 
mean  $37.23  
median  $36.31  
10th percentile  $29.46  
 
Hourly earnings with duplicated and expansive P1 
time* 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳) + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 
 
mean  $19.42  
median  $19.68  
10th percentile  $11.13  
 
Hourly earnings with duplicated, but restricted P1 
time (i.e., P1 that leads to a ride).* 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝑶𝑶𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑶𝑶 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳) + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 
 
mean  $26.14  
median  $25.62  
10th percentile  $19.44  
 
Hourly earnings with de-duplicated but expansive P1 
time (Section 3) 
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳 − 𝑳𝑳𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳) + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 
 
mean  $23.03  
median  $23.20  
10th percentile  $15.72  
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* These findings were not reported elsewhere in this report because duplicated time should not be included. The hourly 
earnings that results from using duplicated time are included here for comparison purposes with other studies. 
  
 
Hourly earnings with de-duplicated but restricted P1 
time (i.e., P1 that leads to a ride) (Section 4) 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝑶𝑶𝑬𝑬𝑨𝑨𝑶𝑶 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳,𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳 − 𝑳𝑳𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑬𝑬𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳) + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 + 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 
 
mean  $26.37  
median  $25.82  
10th percentile  $19.67  
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